Bureaucratic Discretion and Credible Commitment
$28.00 ( ) USD
Adobe eBook Reader
Looking for an examination copy?
If you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact email@example.com providing details of the course you are teaching.
Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession.Read more
- Nontechnical readers will be able to understand the core ideas of the book, initiating a conversation among people with varying backgrounds
- Includes a variety of vignettes throughout the text to provide examples of the application of the theoretical concepts
- Explores the pressures on bureaucracies' decision making from political, institutional, economic, and other social forces
- Co-Winner, 2016 Book of the Year, Section of Public Administration Research (SPAR), American Society of Public Administration
Reviews & endorsements
"The significant new book, Above Politics, by Miller and Whitford, combines eloquent political theory with engaging examples and sophisticated analysis. In the tradition of the Federalist Papers, it provides a persuasive argument about the most important institutional design issues facing democracy today."
Jack H. Knott, University of Southern CaliforniaSee more reviews
"We want our government agencies to be politically accountable. Yet we also want them to have autonomy, so they can utilize their professional expertise to make good decisions. In their lucid, engaging analysis, Miller and Whitford show how the incentives of both politicians and bureaucrats affect the balance between accountability and autonomy. It is a splendid scholarly achievement."
Charles Shipan, University of Michigan
"More thoroughly than anyone before them, Miller and Whitford teach us that politicians cannot commit to keep their hands off of agencies even when to do so would benefit all of us. A rigorous defense of agency independence and professionalized administration."
Dan Carpenter, Harvard University
'This theory-based, theory-driven work masterfully weaves analyses and examples that help demonstrate myriad ways bureaucracies can provide stability to government while enhancing economic development - as long as they are permitted to operate as they need to - while politicians (and the public) regularly question whether bureaucrats are neutral while gaining autonomy … Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through professionals.' W. Miller, Choice
Not yet reviewed
Be the first to review
Review was not posted due to profanity×
- Date Published: July 2016
- format: Adobe eBook Reader
- isbn: 9781316566466
- contains: 5 b/w illus. 1 table
- availability: This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
Table of Contents
2. The moral hazard of bureaucrats and politicians
3. Political moral hazard and credible commitment
4. Political moral hazard and bureaucratic autonomy
5. 'Above politics': the separation of powers and bureaucratic autonomy
6. The control paradox, trust, and leadership
7. Professionalism and credible commitment
8. The politicization of financial regulation
9. The financial crisis and reregulation
Sorry, this resource is locked
Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email firstname.lastname@example.orgRegister Sign in
You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.Continue ×