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Coughlin provides the most comprehensive and integrated analysis of probabilistic voting models available, also developing further his important contributions. Probabilistic voting theory is the mathematical theory of candidate behavior in or in anticipation of elections in which candidates are unsure what voters' preferences will be on all or most issues, which is true of most governmental elections. The theory asks first whether optimal candidate strategies can be determined, given uncertainty about voter preferences, and if so, what exactly those strategies are, given various circumstances. It allows the theorist to predict what public policies will be supported and what laws passed by elected officials when in office and what positions will be taken by them when running in elections. One of the leading contributors to this rapidly developing literature, which is at the leading edge of public choice theory, Coughlin both reviews the existing literature and presents new results that unify and extend developments in the theory that have been scattered in the literature.Read more
- The book provides the most complete and integrated analysis of probabilistic voting models currently available
- Answers important questions about the way in which voters make election choices and the rationale behind the strategies and policies adopted by candidates
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"The book by P. Coughlin, one of the principal contributors to the probalistic voting theory, can be recommended as an up-to-date monograph on the subject, containing both original results and well-annotated references." Journal of Classification
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- Date Published: October 1992
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9780521360524
- length: 268 pages
- dimensions: 229 x 152 x 19 mm
- weight: 0.57kg
- contains: 4 b/w illus.
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
1. Majority rule and models of elections
2. Income redistribution and electoral equilibria
3. Properties of the redistributional equilibria
4. A more general election model
5. Concave social and candidate objective functions
6. Directional, stationary and global electoral equilibria 7. Epilogue.
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