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Political Game Theory

Political Game Theory
An Introduction

$84.99

textbook

Part of Analytical Methods for Social Research

  • Date Published: January 2007
  • availability: Available
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9780521841078

$84.99
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About the Authors
  • Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.

    • Accessible to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics or economics
    • Treats advanced topics that are especially important to political scientists
    • Has a broad range of applications
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    Reviews & endorsements

    "At last, a challenging but accessible graduate-level text for a serious course in game theory for political scientists. Teaching game theory in the context of political-science examples, this book will be the standard text for many years to come." Robert Powell, Berkeley

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    Product details

    • Date Published: January 2007
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9780521841078
    • length: 446 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 29 mm
    • weight: 0.82kg
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    1. Introduction
    2. The theory of choice
    3. Choice under uncertainty
    4. Social choice theory
    5. Games in the normal form
    6. Bayesian games in the normal form
    7. Extensive form games
    8. Dynamic games of incomplete information
    9. Repeated games
    10. Bargaining theory
    11. Mechanism design and agency theory
    12. Mathematical appendix.

  • Instructors have used or reviewed this title for the following courses

    • Advanced Formal Theory
    • Applied Game Theory
    • Game Theory and Political Theory
    • Intro to Game Theory
    • Seminar in Methods
  • Authors

    Nolan McCarty, Princeton University, New Jersey
    Nolan McCarty is Associate Dean and Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. His recent publications include Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (2006 with Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal), The Realignment of National Politics and the Income Distribution (1997 with Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal), as well as many articles in periodicals such as the American Political Science Review and the American Journal of Political Science.

    Adam Meirowitz, Princeton University, New Jersey
    Adam Meirowitz is Associate Professor of Politics and Jonathan Dickenson Bicentennial Preceptor at Princeton University. Recent publications include Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Repeated Elections with Uncertain Policy Constraints (2006) in the Journal of Public Economic Theory and In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communication and Voting with Private Beliefs and Values (2006) in the Journal of Theoretical Politics. He is a recipient of the Heinz Eulau Award from the American Political Science Association and the Robert H. Durr award from the Midwest Political Science Association.

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