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Political Game Theory

Political Game Theory
An Introduction

$79.00

textbook

Part of Analytical Methods for Social Research

  • Date Published: January 2007
  • availability: In stock
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9780521841078

$79.00
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About the Authors
  • Political Game Theory, first published in 2007, is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.

    • Accessibility to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics or economics
    • Treatment of advanced topics that are especially important to political scientists
    • Broad range of applications
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    Reviews & endorsements

    "At last, a challenging but accessible graduate-level text for a serious course in game theory for political scientists. Teaching game theory in the context of political-science examples, this book will be the standard text for many years to come." Robert Powell, Berkeley

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    Product details

    • Date Published: January 2007
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9780521841078
    • length: 446 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 29 mm
    • weight: 0.82kg
    • availability: In stock
  • Table of Contents

    1. Introduction
    2. The theory of choice
    3. Choice under uncertainty
    4. Social choice theory
    5. Games in the normal form
    6. Bayesian games in the normal form
    7. Extensive form games
    8. Dynamic games of incomplete information
    9. Repeated games
    10. Bargaining theory
    11. Mechanism design and agency theory
    12. Mathematical appendix.

  • Authors

    Nolan McCarty, Princeton University, New Jersey
    fm.author_biographical_note1

    Adam Meirowitz, Princeton University, New Jersey
    fm.author_biographical_note2

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