Contents
Preface; Introduction; 1. Realization physicalism; 2. But why not supervenience?; 3. Realizationism and r*d*ct**n*sm; 4. Causation and explanation in a realizationist world; 5. The evidence against realization physicalism; 6. The evidence for realization physicalism; References; Index.
Reviews
"This is unquestionably the best elucidation and defense of physicalism as a general world view ever produced by a philospher." Michael Tye, The University of Texas at Austin
"This excellent book by Andrew Melnyk is both timely and significant. It is timely because now is a good time to take stock of the physicalist debate over the past half century, and Melnyk does that with impressive systematicity and comprehensiveness. Moreover, the book is an important new contribution to that debate. Melnyk offers us a form of physicalism, "realization physicalism", that is robustly reductionist and yet non-eliminative - that is, reductive physicalism that respects the integrity of the casual/explanatory claims of the special sciences. Melnyk's physicalism is a far cry from the pale, insubstantial forms of nonreductive physicalism that have been dominant. One particulary valuable aspect of the book is its extensive coverage of the question of empirical support for physicalism. Here Melnyk goes far beyond those physicalism who take the attitude 'I say that mental states areR^ physical status - refute me if you can!'" Jaegwon Kim, Brown University
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