Philosophers have sought to define knowledge since the time of Plato. This inquiry outlines a theory of rational belief by challenging prominent skeptical claims that we have no justified beliefs about the external world.
Contents
Acknowedgments; Introduction; 1. Conditions for propositional knowledge; 2. Minimal epistemic reasons; 3. Justifying epistemic reasons; 4. Foundationalism and some alternatives; 5. Procedural epistemic rationality; 6. Propositional knowledge; References; Index.
Reviews
"Paul Moser's book is a powerful antidote to the naive but morally and intellectually damaging 'relativism' that pervades much contemporary social and literary theory, but it is much more than that. Unfashionably but persuasively, Moser defends a foundationalist epistemology and a version of the correspondence theory of truth." The Times Higher Education Supplement
"Moser has produced a foundationalist account of justification and knowledge that in some respects is superior to anything else in the literature." William Alston, Syracuse University
"This is an excellent book....No philosophical theory is without its weaknesses, and an overall assessment must compare such weaknesses to those of competing theories. In this respect Moser's foundationalism fares very well, whether the comparison is to foundationalist or to nonfoundationalist alternatives." Timm Triplett, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
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