Cambridge Catalog  
  • Your account
  • View basket
  • Help
Home > Catalog > Ronald Dworkin
Ronald Dworkin
AddThis

Details

  • Page extent: 198 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 0.27 kg
Add to basket

Paperback

 (ISBN-13: 9780521664127)

Manufactured on demand: supplied direct from the printer

$36.99 (P)



Index



A Theory of Justice, 7, 83

abortion

   and liberty of conscience, 110

   Dworkin’s position on, 110, 112, 113, 118–121, 122–123

   fundamental question of, 109

   right to life argument, 115, 116

   sacredness of life, 110

   sacredness of life argument, 115

   state regulation of, 110, 113, 119, 129

abortion debate

   and Roe v. Wade, 115

   as rights-bearing debate, 114

   as sacredness of life debate, 114

   differences with right-to-die debate, 123–124

   Dworkin’s account of, 114, 115–116

   intractability of, 113–114

   parallels with right-to-die debate, 123

   right to life argument, 115, 116

   role of fetus in, 113–114

   sacredness of life argument, 115, 121–122

   standard view of, 113

adjudication

   and Dworkin’s account of the rule of law, 61

   background rights, 61, 66–67

   constitutional morality, 66–67

   constitutional theory, 64

   Dworkin’s theory of, 62–63, 67, 139, 140–141, 165

   enactment force, 65

   gravitational force, 65

   institutional mistakes, 65–66

   institutional rights, 61, 66–67

   legal principles, 61–62

   positivist account of, 29–30

   principle of fairness, 65–66

administrative agencies

   and judicial supremacism, 71–72

   as problem for judicial antipositivism, 71–72

   Dicey’s account of, 70

   Fuller’s account of, 75

   libertarian critique of, 70

Analytic philosophy

   Archimedean skepticism, 9

Archimedeanism, 5–6

   Davidson’s critique of, 6

   Dworkin’s rejection of, 7

   Felix Cohen, 7

   Habermas, 6, 7

   Holmes, 7

   interpretation, 9, 10–11, 13, 17

   Isaiah Berlin, 11

   legal philosophy, 7

   legal realism, 7

   Plato, 6, 7

   practical philosophy, 7

   Quine’s critique of, 6

   Sellars’s critique of, 6

   skepticism, 6–7, 9–10

   social practice, 13

   theoretical philosophy, 6–7

   theories of interpretation, 14

   Walzer’s rejection of, 18

   Wittgenstein’s critique of, 6

auction, 90–91

   metric of opportunity costs, 90–91

   principle of abstraction, 91

   principle of correction, 91

Austin, John

   on positivism and the common law, 78

background rights

   adjudication, 61

   defined, 60–61

   rights thesis, 63–64

   rule of liberal principle, 61

   the rule of law, 60–61

Bentham, Jeremy

   common law as institutional mistake, 70

   constitutionalism as institutional mistake, 70

   critique of judicial antipositivism, 58

   general theory of law, 60

   utilitarianism and legal positivism, 60

Berlin, Isaiah

   Dworkin’s critique of, 11, 84

   on liberty and equality, 82

   on styles of thinking, 18

   political philosophy as conceptual analysis, 82

Bork, Robert

   Dworkin’s critique of, 1

   general theory of law, 77

   professional relationship with Dworkin, 3

Brown v. Board of Education

   Hand’s account of, 4

brute luck

   equality of resources, 93

   luck egalitarianism, 94

chain novel, 15

challenge model

   as formal conception of the good life, 106

choice

   Cohen’s account of, 94

   equality of resources, 89, 92, 93

   responsibility, 96–97

circumstance

   Cohen’s account of, 94

   equality of resources, 93

Cohen, G. A. See also luck egalitarianism

   account of choice, 94

   account of circumstance, 94

   account of equality, 94

   account of responsibility, 94

   on Dworkin’s egalitarianism, 94

Coleman, Jules, 34–35

communism

   egalitarian plateau, 85

comprehensive liberalism

   and equality of resources, 106

constitutional morality

   constitutional theory, 66

   defined, 66

   democracy, 66–67

   institutional rights, 66–67

   judicial interpretation, 66–67

   problem of wicked legal systems, 67–68

constitutional theory

   and institutional mistakes, 65–66

   constitutional morality, 66

   defined, 64

   Dworkin’s account of, 64–67

   enactment force, 65

   gravitational force, 65

   principle of fairness, 65–66

   role of in adjudication, 64

constructive interpretation

   and grounds of law, 40

   and possibility of theoretical disagreements, 39–40

   defined, 39

Cover, Robert M.

   Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process, 136

Critical Legal Studies

   Archimedean skepticism, 9

Cruzan v. Director

   and right-to-die debate, 127

   context of Life’s Dominion, 112

Curtis, Benjamin R., 148

   critique of Emancipation Proclamation, 145–146

Davidson, Donald

   critique of Archimedeanism, 6

democracy

   and legal positivism, 58

Devlin, Patrick

   Dworkin’s criticism of, 12

Dicey, A.V.

   on administrative agencies, 70

difference principle

   as partially endowment sensitive, 98

   as radically choice insensitive, 98

   Dworkin’s rejection of, 98

   parallel with insurance argument, 104

division of responsibility

   defined, 97–98

   Dworkin endorses, 97–98

   insurance argument, 103–104

Dred Scott, 143

   and Missouri Compromise, 153

   Lincoln’s opposition to, 143

Dworkin, Ronald. See judicial antipositivism

   abortion, 110, 112, 113, 118–121, 122–123

   account of equality, 83–84, 89–93

   account of the rule of law, 60–61, 62–67, 68–69

   approach to legal philosophy, 3–4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10–11, 12, 13–15, 18–19

   approach to political philosophy, 3–5, 6, 7, 9, 10–11, 12, 13–15, 18–19, 96, 128

   approach to practical philosophy, 5, 109, 111–112

   biographical details, 2–3

   critique of positivism, 13–14, 23–24, 26–29, 35, 37–39, 40–41

   early philosophical development, 2–5

   egalitarian plateau, 85

   equality of resources, 89–93

   ethics and political philosophy, 4–5, 8, 106, 128, 130

   euthanasia, 110, 112, 113, 124–125, 126–127

   interventions in public life and philosophy, 1–2

   jurisprudential problem of slavery, 137, 138, 139, 149–150, 151–155, 159–160

   law and morality, 23–24, 28, 66–69, 71–73, 120–121, 149–150, 155–157, 158–159

   liberty and equality, 83–84

   problem of wicked legal systems, 68–69

   responsibility, 89, 92, 93, 96–98

   theory of adjudication, 62–67, 139, 140–141, 149–150, 165

   theory of interpretation, 10–11, 39–40

   theory of law, 3–4, 30–31, 138, 155–156

economic analysis of law

   principle of correction, 106

economic theorists of law

   Archimedean skepticism, 9

efficiency

   equality of resources, 105

egalitarian plateau, 85

   communism, 85

   libertarianism, 85

egalitarianism

   critique of Rawls, 83

   Dworkin’s response to, 83–84

Eisenstadt v. Baird

   and right to abortion, 118–119

Emancipation Proclamation

   and Dworkin’s theory of adjudication, 154–155

   and Fugitive Slave Laws, 142

   and US Constitution, 144–148, 154–155

   constitutionality of, 144–148

   Curtis’s critique of, 145–146

   Kirkland’s defense of, 146

   Lincoln’s legal justification for, 144–145

   Lowrey’s defense of, 146

   Whiting’s defense of, 146–147

empirical disagreements

   defined, 36

enactment force

   defined, 65

envy test, 90

   and metric of opportunity costs, 90

   defined, 90

   Hobbes on, 105

equality

   and government policy, 86

   and libertarianism, 85

   as interpretive concept, 96

   as shared ideal, 84–85

   Dworkin’s account of, 83–84, 89, 93

   insurance, 103

   libertarian account of, 85

   relation to freedom, 85–86

   relation to liberty, 82–84

   relation to responsibility, 94–95, 96

   utilitarianism, 84

equality of resources, 89–93

   and incentives, 101–102

   and luck egalitarianism, 94–97

   and political liberalism, 106

   and private transactions, 101–102

   and Rawls, 98, 104

   as a comprehensive liberalism, 106

   as ambition sensitive, 93

   as endowment insensitive, 93

   brute luck, 93

   choice, 89, 91, 92, 93

   circumstances, 93

   division of responsibility, 97–98

   efficiency, 105

   envy test, 90, 105

   equality and responsibility, 96

   freedom, 89, 97, 101–102

   freedom and responsibility, 97–98

   identification, 96–97

   imaginary auction, 90–91

   insurance, 98–99, 102

   luck egalitarianism, 95

   metric of opportunity costs, 90–91, 93

   option luck, 93

   principle of abstraction, 91

   principle of correction, 91

   problem of expensive needs, 98, 102

   problem of expensive tastes, 92–93

   responsibility, 89, 91–92, 93, 96–98, 104

   role of markets, 91, 96, 101–102, 105

   role of state regulation, 91

   the good, 106

equality of welfare, 86–89

   conflict with freedom, 86, 88

   conflict with liberalism, 88

   defined, 86

   disability, 87

   Dworkin’s critique of, 86, 87–89

   illness, 87

   luck egalitarian account of, 94, 95

   problem of expensive tastes, 87, 88–89

   responsibility, 88

   theories of welfare, 86–87

ethics

   challenge model of, 106, 128

   euthanasia, 124–125

   relation to political philosophy, 8, 98, 106, 128, 130

euthanasia, 111

   and critical interests, 124–125

   and ethics, 125

   and experiential interests, 124–125

   Dworkin’s ethical position on, 124–125

euthanasia (cont.)

   Dworkin’s political position on, 110, 112, 113, 126–127

   state regulation of, 110, 113

expensive needs

   and insurance, 98–100

   disability, 98

   illness, 98

expensive tastes

   equality of resources, 92–93

   equality of welfare, 87, 88–89

   luck egalitarianism, 95

   responsibility, 88, 92, 97–98

Fish, Stanley

   account of interpretation, 16

   as Archimedean, 17

   critique of Dworkin, 16

   Dworkin’s response to, 16–17

Framers’ intent

   and Dworkin’s theory of interpretation, 14

freedom, 86.

    See liberty

   and equality of resources, 89

   and equality of welfare, 86, 88

   markets, 101–102

   relation to equality, 85–86

   relation to responsibility, 97–98

Fried, Charles, 157

Fugitive Slave Laws, 141–142

   Dworkin’s critique of, 136, 137

   Dworkin’s theory of adjudication, 152

   Dworkin’s theory of law, 138

   Emancipation Proclamation, 142

   Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 150–151

   U.S. Constitution, 136, 142–143, 150–151

Fuller, Lon L.

   account of the rule of law, 72, 74

   Dworkin’s critique of, 72–73

   law and justification, 74–75

   law and morality, 72, 74–75

   on administrative law, 75

   positivist critique of, 72

   principle of publicity, 74

   response to Dworkin, 73–75

   theory of law, 74

gravitational force

   defined, 65

   principle of fairness, 65

Greene, Abner, 130

Griswold v. Connecticut

   and right of procreative autonomy, 127

grounds of law

   constructive interpretation, 40

   defined, 36–40

   Hart-Dworkin debate, 40–41

   theoretical disagreements, 36–37

Habermas, Jürgen

   approach to philosophy, 6

   Archimedeanism, 7

Hand, Learned

   Brown v. Board of Education, 4

   Dworkin’s reaction to, 4

   legal interpretation, 4

   professional relationship with Dworkin, 2

   skepticism about judicial review, 4–10

Hart, H. L. A. See also legal positivism

   Dworkin’s reaction to, 3–4

   judicial discretion, 29–30

   law and morality, 3

   professional relationship with Dworkin, 2

   relation of moral and legal obligation, 73

   response to Dworkin, 34–35

   theory of law, 30–31

Hart-Dworkin debate

   Dworkin’s characterization of positivism, 24–26, 29

   Dworkin’s critique of positivism, 26–29, 35, 37–39, 40–41

   exclusive positivist response to Dworkin, 31–32

   future of, 49–50

   grounds of law, 40–41

   history of, 22, 23, 35, 41–42

   identification of law, 25

   inclusive positivist response to Dworkin, 33–35

   judicial discretion, 25–27, 29–30

   law and morality, 23–24, 28, 30–31, 33–35, 40–41, 46

   legal obligation, 25–26

   legal rules and principles, 25–29, 30, 32, 35

   models of law, 30–31

   positivist response to Dworkin, 35, 41–42, 43–44, 46, 48–49

   rule of recognition, 25, 27–29, 33–35

   semantic sting argument, 54

   subjects of, 23

   theoretical disagreements, 36–39, 41–44, 48–49

Hayek, F. A.

   administrative agencies, 70

Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors

   Hart-Dworkin debate, 26, 27, 28, 32, 40, 41

Hewart, Gordon

   administrative agencies, 70

Hobbes, Thomas, 105

Holmes, Oliver Wendell

   Archimedeanism, 7

Hume, David, 6

identification

   equality of resources, 96–97

incentives

   equality of resources, 101–102

   insurance, 100–102

   talents, 100–101

institutional rights

   adjudication, 61

   constitutional morality, 66–67

   defined, 61

   rights thesis, 63–64

   rule of liberal principle, 61

   the rule of law, 60–61

insurance

   as hypothetical market, 99

   difference with actual market mechanism, 102–103

   division of responsibility, 103–104

   equality, 103

   incentives, 100–102

   levels of, 99–101

   objections to, 100

   problem of expensive needs, 98–100

   responsibility, 100, 103–104

   slavery of the talented, 108

   talents, 100–101

insurance argument

   and Rawls, 108

   assessment of, 102–104

   parallel with difference principle, 104

   Rawlsian reading of, 103–104

interpretation

   and Patrick Devlin, 12

   Archimedeanism, 10–11, 13, 14, 17

   Berlin, 11

   constructive interpretation, 39–40

   Dworkin’s theory of, 10–15, 17, 39–40

   Dworkin’s theory of as interpretive, 10–11, 17

   Fish’s account of, 16

   Framers’ intent, 14

   interpretive concepts, 12

   legal philosophy, 9, 10–12, 13–14

   moral argument, 10–12

   moral concepts, 12

   objectivity and truth, 15–17

   ordinary moral argument, 11, 12

   political philosophy, 9, 10–12, 13–14

   positivist theory of, 13–14, 43–49

   social practice, 13

judicial antipositivism. See Dworkin, Ronald

   account of constitutional theory, 64–67

   account of the rule of law, 56, 60–61, 62–67, 76

   administrative agencies, 60

   background rights, 61

   Bentham’s critique of, 58

   conceptual challenge to positivism, 61–62

   critique of Fuller, 72–73

   democracy and role of judiciary, 63, 66

   doctrine of political responsibility, 63

   institutional rights, 61

   judicial supremicism, 71

   law and morality, 66–69, 71–72

   objections to, 68–69

   positivist critique of, 58–60

   problem of administrative law, 71–72

   problem of wicked legal systems, 67–69

   relation of judiciary to legislature, 60, 62–63

   rights thesis, 63–64

   role of judiciary and democracy, 66–67

   theory of adjudication, 62–63, 67

judicial supremicism

   administrative agencies, 71–72

   defined, 71

   Roberto Unger on, 80

Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process, 136

   Dworkin’s critique of, 137–138

Kant, Immanuel, 4

Kirkland, Charles P.

   defense of Emancipation Proclamation, 146

Kymlicka, Will, 85

law

   Bentham’s general theory of, 60

   Dworkin’s theory of, 3–4, 30–31, 138, 139, 155–156

   Dworkin’s theory of as general, 60

   Fuller’s theory of, 74

   Hart’s account of, 3

   plain fact view of, 37, 38–39

   positivist theory of, 30–31, 45, 46, 48–49

   relation to morality, 3, 23–24, 30–31, 32, 33–35, 40–41, 45, 46, 48, 56–57, 66–69, 71–75, 149–150, 155–157, 158–159

legal interpretation. See also adjudication

   chain novel, 15

   parallels with literary interpretation, 14–15

   political morality, 15

legal philosophy

   and social practice, 13

   Archimedeanism, 7

   Dworkin’s approach to, 3–4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10–11, 12, 13–15, 18–19

legal philosophy (cont.)

   interpretation, 10–12, 13–14

   ordinary moral argument, 6, 10–11

legal positivism

   account of the rule of law, 56–57

   adjudication, 29–30

   administrative agencies, 59–60

   as general theory of law, 58

   as plain fact view of law, 37

   critique of Fuller, 72

   critique of judicial antipositivism, 58–60

   democracy, 58

   Dworkin’s conceptual challenge to, 61–62

   Dworkin’s critique of, 3–4, 11–12, 13–14, 23–24, 26–29, 35, 37–39, 40–41

   exclusive legal positivism, 31–32

   function of law, 45, 46

   inclusive legal positivism, 33–35

   incorporationists, 53

   interpretive methodology, 43–49

   judicial discretion, 29–30

   law and morality, 3, 31–32, 33–35, 45, 46, 48, 53, 56–57

   legal principles, 32, 61

   legitimacy, 56–57

   relation of judiciary to legislature, 59–60, 62

   repair argument, 39, 42

   response to Dworkin, 24, 35, 41–42, 46, 61–62

   theoretical disagreements, 36–37, 39, 41–44, 48–49

   theory of law, 30–31, 45, 46, 48–49

legal practice

   and legal reasoning, 36–37

   as argumentative, 35–36

legal principles

   Dworkin’s theory of law, 155–157

   Hart-Dworkin debate, 25–29, 32, 35

   law and morality, 156–157

legal realism

   Archimedeanism, 7, 9

legal reasoning

   empirical disagreements, 36

   grounds of law, 36–37

   grounds of law, defined, 36

   propositions of law, defined, 36

   theoretical disagreements, 36–37

legitimacy

   legal positivism, 56–57

   rule of law, 56–57

Leiter, Brian

   Hart-Dworkin debate, 49, 50

Letwin, Shirley Robin

   jurisprudential problem of slavery, 138–139

Leviathan, 105

liberalism

   Dworkin’s account of, 128–130

   equality of welfare, 88

   Sandel’s neutrality critique of, 127–128

libertarianism

   account of distributive justice, 83

   account of equality, 85

   critique of Rawls, 83

   Dworkin’s response to, 83–84

   egalitarian plateau, 85

   equality, 85

   liberty, 83

liberty. See freedom

   and utilitarianism, 84

   as interpretive concept, 96

   Dworkin’s account of, 83–84

   equality of welfare, 86

   libertarianism, 83

   relation to equality, 82–84

liberty of conscience

   abortion, 110

   euthanasia, 110

   physician-assisted suicide, 110

   sacredness of life, 110

   sacredness of life argument, abortion, 119, 122–123

   sacredness of life argument, right-to-die debate, 126–127

   U.S. Constitution, 130–131

life, intrinsic value of

   and sacredness of life, 110

life, sacredness of

   abortion, 110

   abortion debate, 114

   as religious claim, 122, 130–131

   intrinsic value of life, 110

   liberty of conscience, 110, 119

   physician-assisted suicide, 110

   right to abortion, 119

   state regulation, 110

Life’s Dominion

   Dworkin’s approach to legal issues, 111–112

   political and legal context of, 112

Lincoln, Abraham

   legal justification for Emancipation Proclamation, 144–145

   on Fugitive Slave Laws and U.S. Constitution, 142–143

   on legality of slavery, 142–144

   opposition to Dred Scott, 143

Lincoln-Douglas debate

   Dred Scott, 143

   Fugitive Slave Laws and U.S. Constitution, 142–143

literary interpretation

   parallels with legal interpretation, 14–15

Lowrey, Grosvenor P.

   defense of Emancipation Proclamation, 146

luck egalitarianism

   account of equality, 94

   account of responsibility, 94, 95, 96

   approach to political philosophy, 96

   brute luck, 94

   defined, 94

   Dworkin’s differences with, 94–97

   equality and responsibility, 94–95

   equality of resources, 95

   equality of welfare, 95

   expensive needs-expensive tastes distinction, 95

   objectionably focused on choice, 95

   option luck, 94

   problem of expensive tastes, 95

   role of markets, 95–96

markets

   equality of resources, 91

Marx, Karl, 85

McCulloch v. Maryland

   and Fugitive Slave Laws, 150

Methods of Ethics, 20

Michelman, Frank

   distributive justice and the U.S. Constitution, 141

Missouri Compromise, 141

   as checkerboard legislation, 152–153

   Dred Scott, 143

   Dworkin’s theory of adjudication, 152–154

   slavery and U.S. Constitution, 143

   U.S. Constitution, 153–154

moral concepts

   as interpretive concepts, 12

   ordinary moral argument, 12

moral justification, 7–9

   Archimedeanism, 9

   Dworkin’s account of, 8–9, 21

   interpretation, 8–9

   ordinary moral argument, 8, 21

   public reason, 8

   Rawls’s account of, 7–8

   reflective equilibrium, 7–8

   utilitarianism, 20

morality

   interpretation, 10–12

   objectivity of, 10

   relation to law, 3–4, 23–24, 30–31, 32, 33–35, 40–41, 45, 46, 48, 56–57, 66–69, 71–75, 149–150, 155–157, 158–159

   skepticism, 9–10

natural law

   and slavery, 137–138

   defined, 137

Nozick, Robert, 83, 85

   Dworkin’s response to, 98

option luck

   equality of resources, 93

   luck egalitarianism, 94

ordinary moral argument

   interpretation, 11, 12

   legal philosophy, 6, 10–11

   moral concepts, 12

   moral justification, 8, 21

   political philosophy, 6, 10–11

ordinary moral thought. See ordinary moral argument

paternalism argument, euthanasia

   as derivate reason against right-to-die, 123

   defined, 123

physician-assisted suicide, 112.

    See euthanasia

   and sacredness of life, 110

   Dworkin’s position on, 110, 112, 113

   fundamental question of, 109–110

   liberty of conscience, 110

   state regulation of, 110, 113

   Washington v. Glucksberg, 127, 132

Pildes, Richard

   critique of Dworkin, 78

plain-fact view of law

   as positivist, 37

   defined, 37

   Dworkin’s critique of, 39

   repair argument, 39

   Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 38–39

   theoretical disagreements, 37, 39

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 129

   context of Life’s Dominion, 112

   physician-assisted suicide, 127

Plato

   approach to philosophy, 6, 18

   Archimedeanism, 7, 18

political liberalism

   and equality of resources, 106

   Dworkin’s rejection of, 98

   Sandel’s critique of, 128

political philosophy

   Berlin’s approach to, 82

   Dworkin’s approach to, 3–5, 6, 7, 9, 10–11, 12, 13–15, 18–19, 96, 98, 128

   history of, 82–83

   interpretation, 10–12, 13–14

   luck egalitarian approach to, 96

   ordinary moral argument, 6, 10–11

political philosophy (cont.)

   Rawls’s approach to, 98

   relation to ethics, 4–5, 8, 98, 106, 128, 130

   social practice, 13, 17–18

   Walzer’s approach to, 17–18

political responsibility

   doctrine of, 63

positive law

   defined, 137

practical philosophy. See also legal philosophy; political philosophy

   Archimedeanism, 7

   Dworkin’s approach to, 5, 6, 7, 109, 111–112

   ordinary moral argument, 6

Pragmatists

   Archimedean skepticism, 9

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 136

   Dworkin’s theory of adjudication, 151

   Fugitive Slave Laws, 150–151

principle of abstraction, 91

principle of correction, 91

   economic analysis of law, 106

principle of fairness

   gravitational force, 65

   institutional mistakes, 65–66

principle of procreative autonomy

   defined, 119

   U.S. Constitution, 120–121

private transactions

   equality of resources, 101–102

propositions of law

   defined, 36

public reason

   Dworkin’s critique of, 4–5, 8

   Sandel’s critique of, 128

Quine, W. V. O.

   critique of Archimedeanism, 6

Rawls, John

   20th century political philosophy, 82–83

   A Theory of Justice, 7, 83

   and Dworkin, 98, 128, 130

   difference principle, 98, 104

   division of responsibility, 97, 107

   Dworkin’s reaction to, 4–5

   egalitarian critique of, 83

   influence on Dworkin, 4–5

   insurance argument, 103–104

   libertarian critique of, 83

   liberty and equality, 83

   moral justification, 7–8, 21

   political liberalism, 98, 106, 128

   principles of justice, 83

   public reason, 128

   reflective equilibrium, 7–8

Raz, Joseph

   critique of Dworkin, 21

   Hart-Dworkin debate, 32

reflective equilibrium, 7–8

   utilitarianian critique of, 20

resources

   Dworkin’s account of, 89–90

   economics’s account of, 89–90

responsibility

   and metric of opportunity costs, 93

   as interpretive concept, 96

   as metaphysical concept, 96

   choice, 96–97

   division of responsibility, 97–98

   Dworkin’s account of, 95, 96–97

   envy test, 105

   equality of resources, 89, 92, 93, 104

   equality of welfare, 88

   expensive tastes, 88, 92, 97–98

   insurance, 100, 103–104

   luck egalitarian account of, 95, 96

   metric of opportunity costs, 90–92

   relation to equality, 94–95, 96

   relation to freedom, 97–98

   role of markets, 91–92

right to abortion

   autonomy justification of, 132

   Dworkin’s argument for, 118–120, 122–123, 128–129

   Dworkin’s legal argument for, 120–121

   Dworkin’s liberalism, 128–129

   Dworkin’s moral argument for, 121

   Eisenstadt v. Baird, 118–119

   principle of procreative autonomy, 119, 120–121

   problems with Dworkin’s arguments for, 130–133

   right to privacy, 118–119

   sacredness of life argument, 119

   state regulation, 119

right to die

   and Dworkin’s liberalism, 128–129

   autonomy justification of, 132

   Cruzan v. Director, 127

   Dworkin’s argument for, 126–127, 128–129

   problems with Dworkin’s arguments for, 130–133

   U.S. constitution, 127

right to life argument

   and Roe v. Wade, 117

   as derivative reason, 115

   constitutional version of, 117

   defined, 115, 116

   Dworkin’s response to, 116–118

rights thesis

   defined, 63

   institutional rights, 63–64

rights-bearing debate

   and Roe v. Wade, 115

   defined, 114

   Dworkin’s position on, 114

right-to-die debate

   differences with abortion debate, 123–124

   Dworkin’s account of, 123

   parallels with abortion debate, 123

Roe v. Wade

   context of Life’s Dominion, 112

   Dworkin’s position on, 115

   right to life argument, 117

   rights-bearing debate, 115

rule of law

   adjudication, 61

   and administrative agencies, 59–60

   and theories of law, 57, 72

   antipositivist account of, 56

   as rule of liberal principle, 60–61

   Dworkin’s account of, 60–61, 62–67

   Fuller’s account of, 72

   positivist account of, 56–57

   procedural morality of, 76

   rights conception of, 56

   rights model of, 60–61

   rule-book conception of, 56

rule of liberal principle, 60–61, 62–67

   background rights, 61

   institutional rights, 61

   problem of administrative law, 71–72

   problem of wicked legal systems, 68, 69

rule of recognition

   Dworkin’s critique of, 27–29

   Hart-Dworkin debate, 25

sacredness of life argument, abortion

   and liberty of conscience, 122–123

   as detached reason, 115

   as religious under 1st Amendment to U.S. Constitution, 122

   defined, 115

   Dworkin’s account of, 121–122

   Dworkin’s response to, 119, 122–123

   liberty of conscience, 119

sacredness of life argument, right-to-die debate

   and liberty of conscience, 126–127

   as detached reason, 123

   as religious argument, 126

   defined, 123

sacredness of life debate, abortion

   defined, 114

Sandel, Michael

   critique of political liberalism, 128

   critique of public reason, 128

   Dworkin’s response to, 128–129

   neutrality critique of liberalism, 127–128

Sellars, Wilfrid

   critique of Archimedeanism, 6

semantic sting argument

   Hart-Dworkin debate, 54

Sidgwick, Henry, 20

   The Methods of Ethics, 20

skepticism

   Archimedeanism, 6–7, 10

   external skepticism, 9–10

   internal skepticism, 10

   moral argument, 9–10

slavery

   as jurisprudential problem, 139–140, 141, 158

   Dworkin’s jurisprudential account of, 149–150, 151–155

   Dworkin’s theory of adjudication, 149–150, 151–155

   Dworkin’s theory of law, 138, 139

   legal history of, 141–148, 150–151

   natural law, 137–138

   U.S. Constitution, 136, 137–138, 139, 142–148, 149, 150–151, 154–155

slavery of the talented

   equality of resources, 108

Smith, Roger, 156

social practice

   Archimedean account of, 13, 18

   Dworkin’s account of, 13, 18

   interpretation, 13

   legal philosophy, 13

   political philosophy, 13, 17–18

talents

   incentives, 100–101

   insurance, 100–101

Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill

   Hart-Dworkin debate, 41

   plain fact view of law, 38–39

   theoretical disagreements, 37–39

The Antelope

   slavery and legality, 137–138

theoretical disagreements

   central to legal theory, 42–43

   constructive interpretation, 39–40

   defined, 36–37

   Hart-Dworkin debate, 36–39, 41–44, 48–49

   plain-fact view of law, 37, 39

   possibility of, 39–40

   prevalence of, 39

   Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 37–39

Unger, Roberto

   on judicial supremacism, 80

United States v. Seeger

   liberty of conscience, 131

   sacredness of life argument, 122

utilitarianism

   equality as impartiality, 84

   liberty, 84

   moral justification, 20

   reflective equilibrium, 20

Waldron, Jeremy

   response to Pildes, 78

Walzer, Michael

   account of social practice, 17–18

   approach to political philosophy, 17–18

   Dworkin’s critique of, 17–18

   rejection of Archimedeanism, 18

Washington v. Glucksberg

   context of Life’s Dominion, 112

   physician-assisted suicide, 127, 132

welfare

   theories of, 86–87

Whiting, William

   defense of Emancipation Proclamation, 146–147

wicked legal systems, problem of, 67–68

   Dworkin’s response to, 68–69

   rule of liberal principle, 68

Williams, Bernard

   on experiential and critical interests, 125

Wittgenstein, Ludwig

   critique of Archimedeanism, 6


printer iconPrinter friendly version AddThis