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Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas
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  • Page extent: 424 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 0.7 kg

Library of Congress

  • Dewey number: 302.3
  • Dewey version: 21
  • LC Classification: HM716 .C65 2004
  • LC Subject headings:
    • Social groups--Psychological aspects
    • Social conflict--Psychological aspects
    • Group decision making
    • Conflict (Psychology)

Library of Congress Record

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Hardback

 (ISBN-13: 9780521808927 | ISBN-10: 0521808928)

  • Also available in Paperback
  • Published June 2004

Manufactured on demand: supplied direct from the printer

$129.00 (C)



Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas




A social dilemma is a situation in which the interests of the collective and its individual members clash. In these situations individuals typically are tempted to take actions that favor (sometimes even maximize) their short-term egocentric interests. However, if all group members adopt such behaviors, the group suffers since all its members are worse off than they could be by endorsing alternative prosocial actions that favor (sometimes even maximize) the collective interest. This book provides an overview and summary of the state of social psychological research on social dilemmas. It is organized around four core issues: individual differences, which determine people’s preferences for outcomes that promote either their own or their group’s well-being; the study of dynamic processes based on simulations of artificial societies; social dilemmas that emerge in intergroup conflicts; and the effect of various types and sources of uncertainty on behavior in social dilemma situations.

Ramzi Suleiman is Associate Professor at the Department of Psychology, University of Haifa.

David V. Budescu is Professor of Quantitative Psychology at the University of Illinois, Champaign.

Ilan Fischer is lecturer at the Department of Behavioral Sciences, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel.

David M. Messick is Morris and Alice Kaplan Professor of Ethics and Decision in Management at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University.







Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas




Edited by

RAMZI SULEIMAN
University of Haifa

DAVID V. BUDESCU
University of Illinois, Champaign

ILAN FISCHER
Ben Gurion University

DAVID M. MESSICK
Northwestern University







PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK
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Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain
Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa

http://www.cambridge.org

© Cambridge University Press 2004

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2004

Printed in the United States of America

Typeface Palatino 10/12 pt.     System LATEX 2e   [TB]

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Contemporary psychological research on social dilemmas / Ramzi Suleiman . . . [et al.].
   p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-521-80892-8
1. Social groups – Psychological aspects. 2. Social conflict – Psychological aspects. 3. Group decision making. 4. Conflict (Psychology) I. Suleiman, Ramzi.
HM716.C65   2004

302.3–dc21 2003051549

ISBN 0 521 80892 8 hardback







Contents




Contributors page vii
Preface xi
 
PART I. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS
1.    From Generosity to Aggression: Five Interpersonal Orientations Relevant to Social Dilemmas 3
    Paul A. M. van Lange
2.    Effects of Risk Preferences in Social Dilemmas: A Game-Theoretical Analysis and Evidence from Two Experiments 24
    Marcel van Assen and Chris Snijders
3.    Risk Preference As a Predictor of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma 58
    Craig D. Parks
4.    Measurements and Effects of Social-Value Orientation in Social Dilemmas: A Review 71
    Wing Tung Au and Jessica Y. Y. Kwong
5.    Are People in a Collective Society Truly Cooperative? The Interaction of Social Orientation and the Fate of Matrix-Society: A Simulation Study 99
    Toshiaki Doi
 
PART II. DYNAMICAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL DILEMMAS
6.    The Dynamics of Trust and Trustworthiness in Large Groups: A Computer Simulation 127
    Peter de Heus and David M. Messick
7.    Stylized Solutions for Environmental Dilemmas in a Cellular World 155
    Andreas Flache
8.    Freedom of Movement: A Strategic Analysis of Social Dilemmas with the Option to Move 180
    Marcello Gallucci, Paul A. M. van Lange, and Jaap W. Ouwerkerk
9.    The Emergence of Tit-For-Tat Strategies 209
    Ilan Fischer and Ramzi Suleiman
 
PART III. SOCIAL DILEMMAS IN INTERGROUP CONFLICTS
10.    Cooperation in Intergroup Social Dilemmas 227
    Gary Bornstein
11.    Do Democracies Breed Chickens? 248
    Gary Bornstein, Arthur Schram, and Joep Sonnemans
12.    Ingroup Cooperation and the Social Exchange Heuristic 269
    Toko Kiyonari and Toshio Yamagishi
13.    Leadership in Intergroup Social Dilemmas: Accountability, Partisanship and the Public Good 287
    Sherry K. Schneider, Margaret Foddy, and Lenka Bilik
 
PART IV. UNCERTAINTY AND COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS
14.    What We Know (and Do Not Know) about the Effects of Uncertainty on Behavior in Social Dilemmas 315
    Eric van Dijk, Arjaan Wit, Henk Wilke, and David V. Budescu
15.    Explaining Apparent Altruism in Terms of Egoistic Incentives: Not So Fast, Please 332
    Robyn M. Dawes
16.    Dependence and Cooperation in Fuzzy Dilemmas: The Effects of Environmental and Endowment Uncertainty 343
    R. Thomas Boone and Michael W. Macy
17.    Asymmetrical Access to Information in Social Dilemmas with Resource Uncertainty 361
    Mathias Gustafsson, Daniel Eek, and Tommy Gärling
18.    The Interplay between Environmental and Social Uncertainty in Social Dilemmas 376
    Arjaan Wit, Eric van Dijk, Henk Wilke, and Arieneke Groenenboom
 
Index 399






Contributors




Wing Tung Au
Department of Psychology
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong

Lenka Bilik
University of New South Wales
Australia

R. Thomas Boone
Department of Psychology
St. John’s University
United States

Gary Bornstein
Department of Psychology
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Israel

David V. Budescu
Department of Psychology
University of Illinois
United States

Robyn M. Dawes
Department of Social and Decision Sciences
Carnegie Mellon University
United States

Toshiaki Doi
Department of Clinical Psychology
Health Science University of Hokkaido
Japan

Daniel Eek
Department of Psychology
Göteborg University
Sweden

Ilan Fischer
Department of Behavioral Sciences
Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Israel

Andreas Flache
Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology – ICS
University of Groningen
The Netherlands

Margaret Foddy
School of Psychological Science
La Trobe University
Australia

Marcello Gallucci
Department of Social Psychology
Free University
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Tommy Gärling
Department of Psychology
Göteborg University
Sweden

Arieneke Groenenboom
Leiden University
The Netherlands

Mathias Gustafsson
Department of Psychology
Göteborg University
Sweden

Peter de Heus
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology
Leiden University
The Netherlands

Toko Kiyonari
Graduate School of Letters
Hokkaido University
Japan

Jessica Y. Y. Kwong
Department of Psychology
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong

Michael W. Macy
Department of Sociology
Cornell University
United States

David M. Messick
Department of Organizational Behavior
Northwestern University
United States

Jaap W. Ouwerkerk
Department of Social Psychology
Free University
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Craig D. Parks
Department of Psychology
Washington State University
United States

Sherry K. Schneider
Department of Psychology
Monash University
Australia

Arthur Schram
Department of Economics
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands

Chris Snijders
Department of Sociology
Utrecht University
The Netherlands

Joep Sonnemans
Department of Economics
University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands

Ramzi Suleiman
Department of Psychology
University of Haifa
Israel

Marcel van Assen
Department of Methodology and Statistics
University of Tilburg
The Netherlands

Eric van Dijk
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology
Leiden University
The Netherlands

Paul A. M. van Lange
Department of Social Psychology
Free University
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Henk Wilke
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology
Leiden University
The Netherlands

Arjaan Wit
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology
Leiden University
The Netherlands

Toshio Yamagishi
Graduate School of Letters
Hokkaido University
Japan







Preface




The papers in this book explore some of the most pressing issues facing citizens, scientists, and policy makers dealing with social dilemmas today. These dilemmas arise in the management of natural resources like fisheries, forests, or clean air; in the regulation of temptation as with international bribery where firms are induced to pay government officials bribes to have their proposals funded by the government; or in the control of intentional violence where persons are willing to sacrifice their lives if only they can take the lives of their enemies at the same time. All these classes of problems are social rather than technological in nature. They are complicated by the fact that they involve multiple agents, with conflicting incentives, in which ultimate outcomes are far removed, often in time, space, and psychological distance, from the proximal choices of the parties. Thus a decision to pay a bribe to a customs official to clear a pallet of goods from the docks of New York (or Buenos Aires, or London, or Jakarta, or Capetown), does not appear to have a causal effect of creating or supporting corruption. After all, if one disapproves of corruption and only does it because everyone else does it, bribery then is only a regrettable cost of doing business.

   Social dilemma or collective action problems are ubiquitous and vexing. Each real problem, like corruption, has a unique context and history that must be appreciated to be fully understood. There are, however, common elements that social dilemmas share, and these factors may also be valuable in the successful management of these problems. The chapters in this book address four of the central issues that characterize social dilemmas. These issues are individual differences, dynamic properties, intergroup effects, and uncertainty and its consequences.

   The chapters in the first section focus on two sources of individual differences, social value orientation and risk preference. The former, typically denoted as SVOs, refer to people’s preferences for outcomes that promote their own or the group’s well-being. These are generally referred to as pro-self versus prosocial orientation. Some theorists have suggested that these differences reflect the level at which people view the social dilemma. If it is seen as an individual problem, we are likely to have pro-self preferences. If we see the problem as a global or group-level problem, we may have prosocial preferences. A mountain of research has shown that prosocial people are more cooperative than pro-self people, but these findings are little more than validity checks. These chapters report other interesting and important findings, about the effects of these value orientations, their measurement, and their determinants.

   The second source of individual difference analyzed in this section concerns risk preference. It is a characteristic of most social dilemmas that the act of cooperation exposes the cooperator to exploitation by noncooperators. The study of risk preferences in social dilemmas is a relatively new area of research and one that is quite promising, as is evidenced by the findings that are reported.

   Doi’s chapter makes a transition from the study of social-value orientation to the study of the collective consequences of individual differences. This line of research asks the general question of what happens in a group, society, or organization when the choices of people depend on what other people do. Suppose, for instance, that prosocial people are not only more likely to cooperate than pro-self persons, but that they also imitate the cooperative act of another more than pro-self people do. If people can change their choices as a function of what other people do, then a dynamic process is introduced that may result in entirely cooperative or entirely noncooperative populations, or in populations that have a stable mixture of cooperators and noncooperators.

   The study of the dynamics of cooperation in social dilemmas requires, almost by its definition, a different type of methodology. It is typically not feasible to do experiments with large groups, so an alternative – the use of computer simulation – has been widely adopted. Computer simulations allow investigators to specify the qualities of the members of artificial “societies,” including the ways in which the members influence each other, and then to investigate the consequences of these specifications. One of the surprising results of this growing area of research is the finding that cooperative, trusting, and generous behavior can emerge from rather simple rules that entail reciprocity and risk tolerance. However, this area of research is still in its infancy, and the chapters that are included here provide a mere sampling of what we can hope to accomplish using this methodology.

   When we mentioned the concept of a prosocial person, we glossed over an important complication, and that is the issue of which group’s interest a person is trying to promote. Farmers sharing an irrigation system are a group playing some type of a game against nature. The same is true of fishermen trying to allocate quotas for fishing vessels. The challenge in these cases is to induce people to suppress their immediate self-interest for the good of the collective. Things change markedly, as the chapters in the third section note, when we have two groups competing against each other. The general structure of these intergroup conflicts is that the collective, comprising both groups, is best served when the group members do not make prosocial sacrifices. These sacrifices are tribal, intended to benefit one group at the expense of the other group (and the wider sociality as well). The research reported in these chapters suggests that one special case in which cooperation is relatively easy to evoke occurs when the cooperation is aimed at defeating another group. A common enemy elicits tribal cooperation but, paradoxically and sadly, it also leads to arms races that are globally disastrous.

   The final section of the book contains chapters dealing with the critically important issue of uncertainty. Uncertainty in social dilemmas takes many forms, each having a unique role in interfering with cooperative solutions. There may be uncertainty about how much of a resource there is to be shared among the members of a group, uncertainty about how many members there are, uncertainty about the rate at which a resource can replenish itself, uncertainty about the behaviors and/or the intentions of the relevant others, uncertainty about the state of one’s own (or the other’s) resources, and so on. Theoretical analyses of these sources of uncertainty have indicated that they may play qualitatively different roles in developing strategies for cooperation. The chapters in this final section attest to the multifaceted complexity of uncertainty in these dilemmas and highlight the need for future researchers to try to understand its full impact.



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