Now we have seen a new dawn. We did it all despite the great pressure
of the army. Where I live, sixteen campesinos were killed, and not a single guerrillero.
They were killed just as you might kill whatever little animal. For us, this has
been quite a history.
–Campesino leader, Cooperativa La Conciencia, 1992.
In the early 1980s, some of the campesinos who had been active in the 1970s mobilization
allied with guerrilla forces in Usulután, Tenancingo, and other contested
areas of the countryside. A few, mostly younger men, became full-time fighters;
others gave logistical and intelligence support. Together their support was sufficient
to undergird the FMLN’s expansion from strongholds in Morazán and
Chalatenango to a broad swath of national territory, including significant areas
of Usulután, by the end of 1983. While the provision of supplies and the
movement of ordnance were important, the provision of military intelligence concerning
the movement of government forces was the essential campesino contribution to
this expansion and thus to the emergence of a military stalemate by the end of
1983. As a result, large areas of the countryside exhibited dual sovereignty by
the mid-1980s. In some, state authority had been effectively replaced by novel
insurgent institutions. In others, government and insurgent forces contested the
authority to rule.
As insurgent forces expanded their activities in 1982 and 1983, the government
changed its strategy toward winning the "hearts and minds" of residents
of contested areas while intensifying the use of force in FMLN "controlled"
areas. The FMLN successfully reorganized its forces on this new political and
military terrain. In particular, the FMLN maintained its strong advantage in military
intelligence, thanks to enduring political loyalty on the part of insurgent campesinos
and the apparent absence of counterparts providing similarly effective intelligence
to government forces. As a result, the military stalemate continued. Despite the
weakening of the FMLN’s main international supporters (Cuba and Nicaragua)
in the late 1980s, the FMLN’s undiminished military capacity -- brought
home to all during the FMLN’s 1989 offensive -- together with structural
changes in the economy, brought recalcitrant Salvadoran elites to the negotiating
table to end the civil war.
In this chapter I analyze the political foundations and processes of the military
stalemate. I first describe campesino contributions to the emergence of the stalemate
in Usulután. I document the changing military strategies of both armies,
in particular the new emphasis by both sides on building civilian loyalties, as
they sought vainly to break the stalemate. I then analyze the repopulation of
Tenancingo, an initiative that depended on that emphasis. I describe the civil
war and campesino life in the Usulután case-study areas under the stalemate
(1984 to early 1991) and analyze variations among individuals in support for the
ERP. A key point emerges from this history: insurgent military capacity rested
in large part on the political support voluntarily provided by many campesinos.
Continued
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