Algorithmic Game Theory
$64.99 (P)
- Editors:
- Noam Nisan, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University, California
- Eva Tardos, Cornell University, New York
- Vijay V. Vazirani, Georgia Institute of Technology
- Date Published: September 2007
- availability: Available
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9780521872829
$64.99 (P)
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In the last few years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. Students, researchers and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application.
Read more- First book to cover the whole spectrum of algorithmic game theory
- Contributions by all the major researchers in the field
- Applied chapters by researchers and consultants at major firms such as Yahoo, Lehman Brothers, IBM and Microsoft
Reviews & endorsements
"The subject matter of Algorithmic Game Theory covers many of the hottest area of useful new game theory research, introducing deep new problems, techniques, and perspectives that demand the attention of economists as well as computer scientists. The all-star list of author-contributors makes this book the best place for newcomers to begin their studies."
Paul Milgrom, Shirley and Leonard Ely Professor of Humanities and Sciences and Professor of Economics, Stanford UniversitySee more reviews"Computer scientists never lose sight of the fact that a solution to an economic or social problem is not really feasible unless it is computationally tractable, and their toolkit has the potential to give new theoretical flesh to venerable economic intuitions such as the invisible hand, or the problematic nature of market socialism. Algorithmic Game Theory is a collection of essays by leading computer scientists and economists surveying the state of the art, and the open problems, in the many branches of this rapidly moving area. It is ideal for graduate students, and for established researchers in either economics or computer science, who wish to learn about the concepts and issues shaping an increasingly important stream of interdisciplinary research."
Professor Andrew McLennan, School of Economics, University of Queensland"The most exciting current research in game theory and its applications is being done in computer science. Algorithmic Game Theory effectively brings the reader to the frontiers of this research."
Ehud Kalai, James J. O'Connor Distinguished Professor of Decision and Game Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University"I recommend Algorithmic Game Theory."
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×Product details
- Date Published: September 2007
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9780521872829
- length: 778 pages
- dimensions: 254 x 178 x 41 mm
- weight: 1.55kg
- contains: 36 b/w illus.
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
Introduction Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani
Part I. Computing in Games:
1. Basic solution concepts and computational issues Éva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani
2. Algorithms for equilibria Christos Papadimitriou
3. Equilibrium computation for games in strategic and extensive form Bernhard von Stengel
4. Learning, regret minimization and correlated equilibria Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour
5. Graphical games Michael J. Kearns
6. Cryptography and game theory Yevgeniy Dodis and Tal Rabin
7. Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria Vijay V. Vazirani
8. Computation of market equilibria by convex programming Bruno Codenotti and Kasturi Varadarajan
Part II. Algorithmic Mechanism Design:
9. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists) Noam Nisan
10. Mechanism design without money James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra
11. Combinatorial auctions Noam Nisan and Liad Blumrosen
12. Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms Ron Lavi
13. Profit maximization in mechanism design Jason Hartline and Anna Karlin
14. Distributed algorithmic mechanism design Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Schapira and Scott Shenker
15. Cost sharing Kamal Jain and Mohammad Mahdian
16. On-line mechanisms David C. Parkes
Part III. Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria:
17. Introduction to the inefficiency of equilibria Tim Roughgarden and Éva Tardos
18. Routing games Tim Roughgarden
19. Inefficiency of equilibria in network formation games Éva Tardos and Tom Wexler
20. Selfish load-balancing Berthold Vöcking
21. Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms Ramesh Johari
Part IV. Additional Topics:
22. Incentives and pricing in communication networks Asuman Ozdaglar and R. Srikant
23. Incentives in peer-to-peer systems John Chuang, Michal Feldman and Moshe Babaioff
24. Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issues Jon Kleinberg
25. Incentives and information security Ross Anderson, Tyler Moore, Shishir Nagaraja and Andy Ozment
26. Computational aspects of information markets David M. Pennock and Rahul Sami
27. Manipulation-resistant reputation systems Eric Friedman, Paul Resnick and Rahul Sami
28. Sponsored search auctions Sebastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Amin Saberi and Rakesh V. Vohra
29. Algorithmic issues in evolutionary game theory Michael Kearns and Siddharth Suri.
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