The European Union (EU) has been hit by a series of crises in the past two decades testing its sense of solidarity and institutional design, namely the 2008 financial crisis, the migration crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and now most recently, the Russia-Ukraine War. The war has already triggered some fundamental changes in the European security architecture and sparked debates on the prospect of transformative change for the EU’s future institutional design and in some key policy areas including enlargement, migration, and energy/climate change.   

European Security Architecture

The war in Ukraine has been unprecedented in bringing together EU member states rapidly in the field of foreign policy. Germany decided in a period of less than a week to substantially increase its defense spending. This war has also attested to the fact that Europe still relies primarily on NATO and the United States which means that the post-Second World War model of ensuring European security through the military presence of the US and the political and economic integration embodied in the EU continues to prevail. Nonetheless, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has also brought to the forefront debates on the need and prospects for the EU to develop a more substantial and unified security and defense policy that is autonomous from the US.

The origins of this debate are rooted in the history of European integration and have assumed center stage after security crises hit the European continent, most notably during the Yugoslav Wars. France in particular has been the front runner in pushing the case for an autonomous European security and defense policy but often met with resistance from the UK and Germany, as well as Central and Eastern European countries which were adamant about US presence. Yet, this debate has assumed a more critical significance after Donald Trump’s presidency, which shed a series of doubts on the US’s reliability as a guarantor for European security. Trump’s presidency witnessed consistent US criticisms of European allies for failing to meet their security commitments under NATO and relying too much on the US for attaining their military security. The possibility of a Republican victory in the 2024 US elections and the withdrawal of strong US military support in the context of the war raises security fears in the EU in the face of sustained Russian aggression and suggests that the debates on an autonomous European security and defense policy may not subside anytime soon.  

Differentiated Integration

Differentiated integration refers to a state of affairs where EU member states are included in some EU policies and remain outside of others. Differentiated integration is not limited to inside the EU but can also occur in the context of the EU’s relations with third countries. The Danish and Swedish opt-outs from the Eurozone or Turkey’s Customs Union agreement with the EU can all be viewed as cases of differentiated integration.   

The EU has for long been discussing how to develop its existing models of differentiated integration. While it works relatively well on the inside, external differentiation poses more problems for both the EU and third countries like Turkey as these states are not included in the EU’s decision-making mechanisms while being subject to EU policies. Applications for EU membership by Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova after the Russia-Ukraine War have further triggered debates on the future of differentiated integration. As the EU’s enlargement process is often a lengthy and cumbersome one where candidate states are expected to adopt and implement a heavy load of legal and institutional reforms, it is clear that these countries, and in particular Ukraine after the devastation of the war, will be far from meeting these obligations in the foreseeable future. Yet, the EU wants to keep these countries in its fold in the face of Russian aggression but is also aware of the difficulties involved with the enlargement policy as well as the weak transformative power of the EU on third countries where enlargement is not a realistic option. This is the key reason behind the intensification of this debate after the war, to the extent that French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech at the European Parliament on Europe Day where he called for a “European political community” based on differentiated integration with the countries of the EU’s wider neighborhood. Coupled with the Western Balkan countries’ slow path to accession, these new membership applications may lead the EU to design more inclusive forms of differentiated integration with the partial participation of third countries in EU institutions and decision-making, which also does not exclude the prospect of full membership in the long term.           

Key Policies: Migration, Energy/Climate Change and Sanctions

The Russia-Ukraine war has also led to significant changes in some key EU policies including migration, energy/climate change, and sanctions. Regarding migration, six million people have already fled Ukraine and studies suggest that the number of Ukrainian refugees in the EU might rise to eight million. In the face of this challenge, for the first time in its history, the EU has operationalized its temporary protection mechanism which grants refugees the right to education and employment for a period of 1-3 years in EU member states. It can also be argued that this situation has further increased the salience of the EU-Turkey Migration Deal of 2016 as this new wave of migration, given the general anti-migrant sentiment across EU member states, creates a politically risky situation for leaders who would not wish to jeopardize the deal in the South. Concerning climate change/energy policies, the Commission has already declared a new plan during the aftermath of the war which pledges to completely end the EU’s dependence on Russian oil and gas by 2030. This overlaps with the EU’s ambitious climate goals embodied in the European Green Deal which aims to make the EU a carbon-free zone by 2050.    

Following the outbreak of the war, the EU has announced five consecutive sanctions packages, including individual and economic sanctions, media restrictions, and diplomatic measures. An embargo on Russian oil, however, which will constitute the sixth package, is currently being blocked by Hungary a country with severe democratic backsliding and close ties to Russia. The principle of unanimity in foreign policy is once again hampering the EU’s ability to respond rapidly and effectively in crises. The longer this war continues, the bigger the test of resilience will be on the part of Europe. The need to sustain European solidarity in the face of this possibility may thus even lead to the much-dreaded change of the voting mechanism in the EU from unanimity to a qualified majority in matters of European foreign policy.        

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