{"id":57795,"date":"2024-01-24T13:45:00","date_gmt":"2024-01-24T13:45:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/?p=57795"},"modified":"2024-01-24T13:39:19","modified_gmt":"2024-01-24T13:39:19","slug":"long-term-risks-and-future-generations","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/2024\/01\/24\/long-term-risks-and-future-generations\/","title":{"rendered":"Long-term Risks and Future Generations"},"content":{"rendered":"
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There is a strong presentism bias<\/span><\/a> in current modes of governance. A high-velocity, short-term culture dominates our political, financial, social and cultural systems, to the point of systematically lacking concern for future generations and the risks they face. Risks range from environmental collapse to risks from new technologies. Evidence of political carelessness for the long-term abounds: from a lack of pandemic preparation, stalling climate policy, disregard for long-term risks such as bioweapons to a highly dysfunctional, unresponsive political system. The causes for this presentism bias are many and varied. They can be found in cognitive biases and heuristics, such as availability bias, at the personal level (<\/span>Yudkowsky, 2008; Tetlock and Gardner, 2015; Morewedge et al, 2015); institutional<\/span><\/a> <\/a><\/span>frames<\/span><\/a>, such as the 4\u20135-year parliamentary cycle<\/span> (Healy & Malhotra, 2009; Jacobs 2011 ; Boston, 2016) combined with an unbalanced policy process<\/span><\/a> where special interests are typically overrepresented (<\/span>Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 2004; Stratmann, 2005; Rahman, 2017); as well as in insufficient, non-resilient mechanisms for cooperation at the global level (<\/span>Boyd & Wilson, 2020). <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n

As a result, future generations are generally neglected in governance and cannot participate in negotiating to secure their interests in the social contract (Brundtland Commission\u2019s report \u2018Our Common Future, 1987). While some strands of moral philosophers argue that future generations should be given a similar weight we do to the well-being of those alive today (Ord, 2021; Mackaskill, 2022), mainstream economists tend to give less weight to future generations than to current ones when weighting up the costs and benefits of a course of action (e.g. Farber, 2022). However, a growing concern about long-term risks \u2013 most prominently climate change, bio-security and AI risks \u2013\u00a0\u00a0is leading to growing public awareness\u00a0\u00a0of the importance of long-term thinking as a civilizational priority. Amid the advocacy and support of a community made of nonstate actors \u2013 ranging from NGOs, philanthropies, and other social change players \u2013 the idea of embedding future generations within existing policy ecosystems\u00a0<\/b>may\u00a0indeed\u00a0be gaining traction. Several governments are\u00a0setting up new dedicated institutions and processes across the world and a formalised<\/span>\u00a0\u2018Network of Institutions for Future Generation<\/a>s\u2019\u00a0are recently emerged.\u00a0Wales<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0New Zealand<\/span><\/a>\u00a0are among several countries at the forefront of\u00a0future generation\u00a0policy reforms, as well as\u00a0\u00a0Finland (Parliamentary Committee for the Future; SDG-aligned budgeting; Economy of Well-being), Scotland (National Performance Framework) and Iceland (Well-being Framework Indicators informing the 5-Year Fiscal Strategic Plan).\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n

The emergence of a panoply of academic as well as institutional and privately-led initiatives suggest that embedding future generations within existing policy ecosystems<\/span> <\/b>may provide a unique opportunity to counter short-termism. Yet these initiatives remain on the margins thus failing to translate into an autonomous, self-aware community of practice, movement, and academic discipline.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A new Special Issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation<\/em><\/span><\/a> contributes to fill this gap, by bringing together social scientists interested in how to integrate the interests of future generations into policymaking processes. Rather than focusing on the whys<\/i> future generations must be considered \u2013 a debate that pertains to philosophers \u2013, this Special Issue focuses on the hows<\/i> by providing an historical, conceptual and case-study-based account of the multiple efforts at <\/span>aligning the actions of decision-makers with the interests of future generations. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the conceptual and practical proposals arising out of concern for future generous are numerous and scattered, this Special Issue intends to map out the various strategies, approaches and models aimed at defending \u2013 both substantively and institutionally \u2013 the interests and sometimes rights of future generations. <\/span>And do so beyond the environment and climate space by focusing instead on long-term risks with a potentially destabilizing impact, as they provide a clear-cut case of how the interest of future generations are currently being neglected. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Virtually all institutional and procedural interventions currently considered are meant to expand the imaginative capacity of policymakers \u2013 be they parliamentarians, public officials or members of government \u2013 by confronting them with a future perspective. Yet, as illustrated by all <\/span>contributions to this Special<\/a><\/span> Issue<\/a>, achieving the inclusion of future generations\u2019 interests into contemporary policymaking requires more than their codification and operationalization through the establishment of institutions, procedural mechanisms, processes or other institutional tweaks. It also requires a broader, more holistic and proactive approach by all public authorities to create the conditions for all stakeholders to deepen their understanding of the future and act on that new awareness. The Special Issue calls for <\/span>a more imaginative theorization and operationalization of the recognition of future generations\u2019 interests in contemporary policymaking beyond today\u2019s institutional and conceptual models. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

Alberto Alemanno is the Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Law, HEC Paris and founding editor-in-chief of the European Journal of Risk Regulation<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

There is a strong presentism bias in current modes of governance. A high-velocity, short-term culture dominates our political, financial, social and cultural systems, to the point of systematically lacking concern for future generations and the risks they face. Risks range from environmental collapse to risks from new technologies. Evidence of political carelessness for the long-term abounds: from a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":583,"featured_media":57796,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,7],"tags":[3393],"coauthors":[11059],"class_list":["post-57795","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-law","category-social-sciences","tag-european-journal-of-risk-regulation"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/57795","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/583"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=57795"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/57795\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":57832,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/57795\/revisions\/57832"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/57796"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=57795"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=57795"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=57795"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=57795"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}