{"id":59049,"date":"2024-04-24T10:00:00","date_gmt":"2024-04-24T09:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/?p=59049"},"modified":"2024-04-23T13:59:50","modified_gmt":"2024-04-23T12:59:50","slug":"criminal-justice-principles-and-trust-theory-from-the-german-law-journal","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/2024\/04\/24\/criminal-justice-principles-and-trust-theory-from-the-german-law-journal\/","title":{"rendered":"Criminal justice, principles, and trust theory from the German Law Journal"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/div>\n

A new issue of the German Law Journal<\/em><\/a> opens with a distinctive criminal justice flavour, as both of the opening articles engage with issues concerning crime. Otava Piha<\/a><\/u><\/strong>\u2019s aim in her article is \u2018to find a thought framework that allows us to compare sexual crimes and property crimes without reducing people to objects or forgetting about human dignity\u2019. She makes the case that this comparison elucidates the role played by autonomy \u2013 understood as scalar, relational, and multidimensional, and as \u2018an enabler of human interaction \u2013 and proceeds to distinguish between autonomy over property and sexual autonomy with a view to resolving practical problems with consent-based rape laws.

Sticking with criminal justice, this issue\u2019s next article, from Anton Moiseienko<\/a><\/u><\/strong>, considers targeted sanctions \u2013 that is, sanctions directed at specific individuals or groups \u2013 as a novel yet significant \u2018criminal justice tool in everything but name\u2019. Moiseienko leads the argument that, while at the moment targeted sanctions, such as asset-freezing and travel bans, occupy a shadowy \u2018netherworld between diplomacy and economic coercion\u2019, these should be \u2018normalized\u2019 as a conventional tool of criminal justice. He further makes the case that \u2018a coherent set of principles is required to determine their relationship with other responses to criminal behavior\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anatoliy Ryzhenkov and Aleksey Anisimov<\/a><\/u><\/strong>\u2019s article moves us into the realm of international environmental law, and the \u2018new legal reality\u2019 whereby \u2018the harm doer is unknown to the affected party, and it is impossible or difficult to establish their identity\u2019, thus rendering impossible the recovery of compensation for the harm caused. In a wide-ranging paper that considers those issues of harm caused by satellite collisions with space debris, climate change, and pollution of the World Ocean, the authors establish the view that only a \u2019combination of international and national law can \u2026 create an effective mechanism to counteract the illogical situation of lack of compensation to persons affected by environmental torts in cases of no specific tortfeasor\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Next, Sofiya Kartalova<\/a><\/u> <\/strong>\u2013 in her first article of two in this issue! \u2013 problematises the \u2018originator control principle (ORCON)\u2019, under which European Union Member States\u2019 national intelligence services are able to restrict European Parliamentary access to confidential data necessary for Europol\u2019s effective exercise of joint parliamentary scrutiny. Citing this ORCON principle as a \u2018major impediment to intelligence sharing in practice\u2019, Kartalova employs the insights of trust theory to argues in favour of a \u2018broader and more productive conceptualization of trust\u2019 within the EU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mark Konstantinidis<\/a><\/u><\/strong>\u2019 article \u2013 like Piha\u2019s above \u2013 concerns autonomy, although in this case it is the EU principle of autonomy. Focusing on international organisations (\u2018IOs\u2019), this article purports to explore the \u2018relatively unexplored\u2019 relationship between autonomy and international law. It leads the argument that there is \u2018a positive correlation between the degree of an IO\u2019s autonomy and the robustness of the dispute settlement mechanisms for which it provides\u2019, and concludes that, while autonomy does not yet seem to constitute a principle of international law, this is not the case in the EU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Continuing this discussion of principles, the third article in this vein comes from Ma\u0142gorzata Kozak<\/a><\/u><\/strong>, who discusses the media pluralism principle. This paper analyses the place of media pluralism in EU law, and poses the intriguing question: \u2018how do we ensure that public funds supporting such broadcasters do not undermine media pluralism by distorting citizens\u2019 rights to be informed?\u2019 In situations where EU values have been violated, Kozak makes the case that, under state aid rules, the European Commission is not only empowered to act to protect media pluralism but also obligated to do so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This issue concludes with Sofiya Kartalova<\/a><\/u><\/strong>\u2019s second article, which also uses trust theory, this time to inform her discussion of the hypothetical scenario whereby Article 7(2) TEU is activated simultaneously against more than one backsliding EU Member State, the titular \u2018bad apples\u2019. She argues against the idea \u2013 promulgated by Dimitry Kochenov \u2013 of extending the voting exclusion from the Member State in question to \u2018cover other Member States currently undergoing the same scrutiny under Article 7(2) TEU\u2019, warning that this is likely to be ineffective and, moreover, through the levels of distrust likely to be generated, has the potential to jeopardise the EU legal order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As always, happy reading.
Jen Hendry
on behalf of the GLJ Editors-in-Chief<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A new issue of the German Law Journal opens with a distinctive criminal justice flavour, as both of the opening articles engage with issues concerning crime. Otava Piha\u2019s aim in her article is \u2018to find a thought framework that allows us to compare sexual crimes and property crimes without reducing people to objects or forgetting […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":583,"featured_media":59050,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,7],"tags":[8439,8630],"coauthors":[8631],"class_list":["post-59049","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-law","category-social-sciences","tag-german-law-journal","tag-glj-editorial-message"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59049","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/583"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=59049"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59049\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":59051,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59049\/revisions\/59051"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/59050"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=59049"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=59049"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=59049"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=59049"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}