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24 - Legal Positivism and Meta-Ethics

from Part V - Normativity and Values

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 January 2021

By
Kevin Toh
Edited by
Torben Spaak  and
Patricia Mindus
Torben Spaak
Affiliation:
Stockholms Universitet
Patricia Mindus
Affiliation:
Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
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Summary

Toh presents an overview of the relation between legal positivism and meta-ethical theories, arguing that philosophers of law, debating the nature of law, can gain insights from a study of meta-ethics, and that one such insight, a methodological insight, is that legal philosophers can and should follow moral philosophers and give up (what he refers to as) the double-duty presumption, that is, the presumption that theories of (the nature of) law must also give answers to the usual type of questions concerning the interpretation and application of the law.

Keywords

meta-ethicsdouble-duty presumptionacceptances of rulesVerstehenregulatives and evaluatives
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism , pp. 561 - 584
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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