The first consequence of sales was to facilitate the capture of the colonial administration by local elites, enabling self-dealing across its ranks. By examining the composition of audiencia councils, the chapter shows that the value of offices under their watch (corregimientos, alcaldias) exponentially increased with the share of purchasers in the audiencia, consistent with laxer oversight. The effect is driven by the audiencias, where the Crown was less concerned about the quality of its members as they faced lower geopolitical threats. It is also driven by the influx of audiencia members with strong local connections that would particularly benefit from colluding with lower-level officials. This statistical evidence helps substantiate historical accounts of profitable complementarities between audiencia members and corregidores and alcaldes in the territories (now countries) of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile. These networks and connections would prove difficult to eradicate, even after the end of sales.