Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 December 2022
This chapter focuses on Ludwig Wittgenstein's “Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough,” which were written around 1931. Four main themes emerge from these notes. Reviewing them shows the complex interconnections between Wittgenstein's views on philosophy, anthropology, mythology, and science. At bottom, these themes are unified by a deep form of anti-scientism and by an underlying yet sustained criticism of key elements of Western culture. These elements are, first, the idea that science provides the uniquely correct method of explanation of all kinds of phenomena—physical as well as cultural. Second, the idea that just like science aims at identifying the causes of physical phenomena by subsuming them under theories, also philosophy and, relatedly, social “sciences” like anthropology should follow suit and build theories that, when correct, would explain the causes of the phenomena they scrutinize. Thirdly, that there is cultural progress to be measured by the degree of similarity between a given society and Western cultures, where science plays such a fundamental role.
After briefly presenting Frazer's The Golden Bough, I focus on Wittgenstein's criticism of that work, dwelling on his idea that magic and religious rituals do not stem from false beliefs, even when the latter are part of them. For Wittgenstein, they do not arise from a false science; rather, they stem from the distinctively human need of celebrating whatever is replete with value. I then closely examine Wittgenstein's preferred methodology in anthropology and philosophy: the application of a family resemblance method aimed at producing perspicuous representations of the phenomena under scrutiny. I connect it to the morphological method propounded by Goethe and Spengler, showing how Wittgenstein was inspired by yet critical of the way in which his predecessors had developed it. I then consider Wittgenstein's remarks on the notion of mythology that, for him, constitutes a vital element of language and of the way in which we organize experience in the process of acquiring justification and knowledge. Finally, I consider how, for Wittgenstein, Frazer is the epitome of the dangers inherent to scientism, which he sees as a characteristic feature of Western cultures and against which he developed the original philosophical methodology of his later work.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.