Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 1 I hypothesized that Brazilian politicians do not seek to build careers in the Chamber of Deputies. Instead, they view a Chamber seat as a potential stepping-stone to a more powerful office, typically at the executive level in state and/or municipal administration. I also tried to explain why this career path exists by noting that legislative careerism is associated with the institutionalization of a hierarchy of positions, and of norms regulating access to such positions, within a legislature. When politicians desire long-term careers in a legislative body, they will create a hierarchy of positions and nondiscretionary access norms. In the absence of legislative careerism, neither hierarchy nor such norms should exist.

In this chapter I provide evidence to support this hypothesis. First, I present quantitative evidence of the rates at which Brazilian deputies seek and win reelection. I gathered data from all legislative elections held from 1945–98, including the “controlled” elections during the dictatorship, and show that legislative turnover is fairly high and that legislative careerism is extremely rare in Brazil. I also show that the relatively stronger, more prominent legislators tend to run for positions outside the Chamber, while weaker deputies are more likely to run for reelection. This is not only additional evidence of a low incentive to develop a career in the Chamber, but also helps explain the high turnover rate.