Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- 1 The Problem of the Horizontal Effect of Constitutional Rights during the Drafting of the Polish Constitution
- 2 Holders of Constitutional Rights and Freedoms
- 3 Direct Application of the Constitution as the Condition for the Horizontal Effect of Constitutional Rights and Freedoms
- 4 The Scope of the Horizontal Effect of Constitutional Rights
- 5 Adaptations of Models of the Horizontal Effect of Constitutional Rights and Freedoms in the Polish Constitutional Reality
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 January 2018
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- 1 The Problem of the Horizontal Effect of Constitutional Rights during the Drafting of the Polish Constitution
- 2 Holders of Constitutional Rights and Freedoms
- 3 Direct Application of the Constitution as the Condition for the Horizontal Effect of Constitutional Rights and Freedoms
- 4 The Scope of the Horizontal Effect of Constitutional Rights
- 5 Adaptations of Models of the Horizontal Effect of Constitutional Rights and Freedoms in the Polish Constitutional Reality
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
Summary
There is no doubt in contemporary jurisprudence that constitutional norms, including those that enshrine rights and freedoms, not only determine the shape of the relations between an individual and the state (so-called vertical relations), but also influence relations between private entities (so-called horizontal relations). This is so, because private law may not be formed independently of the constitution, which has the supreme legal force, while relations between private entities may not be entirely detached from the rights guaranteed by the state to the parties to these relations. In view of the foregoing, for several decades now, in the legal literature of a number of countries references have been made to the horizontal application of constitutional rights, their horizontal dimension or their horizontal effect.
The need to take constitutional rights into account when shaping horizontal relations is justified in a number of ways. First, it is said that, at present, private entities breach the constitutional rights of an individual more oft en than they are breached by states, particularly those with a democratic system. The assumption that private entities are not bound by constitutional rights would mean that the need to protect these rights in democratic states – given that such rights are respected by public authorities as a matter of policy – might prove superfluous. Secondly, it is pointed out that, because dignity is the source of constitutional rights, the latter – like dignity – must be protected in a universal and uniform, rather than partial and selective, manner. Thus, the application of constitutional rights cannot be restrained only to the sphere of relations between an individual and the state, while considering that the same rights might be violated in relations between individuals. Thirdly, constitutional rights are at present an indispensable element of a democratic constitution, and the latter is no longer merely a normative act that governs the organization of the state and the principles of functioning of public authorities. The constitution enters into new areas of social life, interfering with the shape of relations between employers and employees, parents and children, and consumers and entrepreneurs. Accordingly, given that the extent of constitutional regulation is expanding, the scope of constitutional rights should not be limited solely to relations between an individual and the state.
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- Publisher: Jagiellonian University PressPrint publication year: 2015