Skip to main content
×
×
Home
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 1
  • Cited by
    This (lowercase (translateProductType product.productType)) has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Eitel, Adam 2016. Virtue or Art?: Political Friendship Reconsidered. Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 44, Issue. 2, p. 260.

    ×
  • Print publication year: 2005
  • Online publication date: June 2012

6 - Justice as a character-related virtue (Nicomachean Ethics, book 5)

Summary

THE PLATONIC CONTEXT

Aristotle's discussion of justice, which he regards as one among other character-related virtues, is quite different from a treatment of justice which one might find in John Stuart Mill or John Rawls. Aristotle devotes much labor, for instance, to defining justice as a “particular” rather than a “general” virtue. In order to appreciate why, we need (once again) to understand the Platonic context in which he is evidently writing.

Aristotle begins book 5 by remarking,

We observe, then, that everyone intends, in referring to “justice,” to mean that condition of character which makes someone the sort of person who does just actions, and responds justly, and who likes to see justice done. In the same way, by “injustice” they mean that which makes someone the sort of person who acts unjustly and likes to see injustice done. Very well, then, for a start, let us adopt these as schematic definitions.

(1129a6–11)

By the end of chapter 5 he has filled in those schemata, and he gives the following as his finished definitions:

Justice is that with respect to which a just person is said to be the sort of person who, of his own choice, does what is just, and who distributes goods, both to himself in his dealings with others, and to others in their relations to one another, not in such a way that he gets more of what is desirable, and his neighbor gets less (and contrariwise for harmful things), but rather in such a way that he gets an equal amount (that is, a proportionately equal amount), and, likewise, when he distributes goods to others, and he's not himself involved, he does so in such a way that the others each get an equal amount (again, a proportionately equal amount).[…]

Recommend this book

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this book to your organisation's collection.

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
  • Online ISBN: 9780511802041
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to *
×