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3 - The duty to extend the biological warranty period

from Part I - The duty to aid in an ageing world

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2016

Colin Farrelly
Affiliation:
Queen's University, Ontario
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Summary

Why do individuals have any intrinsic constraints upon their health and longevity? Why are we not designed for permanent maintenance? The disposable soma theory provides the answer. This account of aging maintains that biological aging occurs because natural selection favors a strategy in which reproduction is made a higher biological priority (in terms of the utilization of resources) than the somatic maintenance needed for indefinite survival. The story of the intrinsic constraints of our biology thus begins with the story of the world’s extrinsic risks. The world is a dangerous place. Death is, for all living things on this planet, inevitable. In order for any species’ existence to persist over time a solution to death must be found. And that solution, for us and for other sexually reproducing species, is reproduction. There is thus a real race between reproduction and death, and all the species alive today are, at least for the moment, winning this race. But for all the species that are now extinct, like the Mammoth and Neanderthal, the race was lost. Adopting this organismal perspective is important because it brings to the fore the fact that a biological trade-off must be, and has been, made between the physiological resources we invest into reproduction and those invested in the maintenance of the soma. Reproduction is given a higher biological priority, which means that, while our bodies and minds are not designed to fail, a consequence of the priority placed on reproduction is that there are inevitable health problems as the ‘biological warranty period’ expires (typically by the seventh decade of life). Extending the moral argument from the previous chapter, I argue that there is a pressing moral imperative to extend the biological warranty period of humans, which is a distinct (and more attractive goal) than simply trying to prevent or reduce the risk of specific causes of mortality. The chapter concludes by considering two objections typically raised against extending the lifespan- what I call the Too Many People in the World is Bad Objection, and the Greater Inequality is Bad Objection.
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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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