MORAL AGENCY AND THE BEHAVIORIST CONNECTION

B. F. Skinner (1971) tells us that the science of operant behavior is the science of values. Using this simple and elegant proposal, we may have a way to link sociobiologically based theories about values with a theory of learning to form an integrated biologically and psychologically based theory of moral agency. The basic reinforcers on which all operant learning builds can be considered from the sociobiological point of view to be evolutionarily based. On the foundation of these basic reinforcers, we can then learn new and complex behaviors that enable us to achieve our goals in complex and changing environments. Can the behaviorist connection provide the necessary supplement to a sociobiological account of moral agency, making it an adequate account of our moral agency? In this chapter, I lay out the major points of Skinner's behaviorist account of moral agency. My goal is to understand and assess Skinner's claim that the science of operant behavior is the science of values and to determine to what extent our moral agency can be accounted for in terms of evolutionarily and operantly based moral capacities. Before we examine the details of Skinner's account of moral agency, let's sketch out some of the distinctive features of both behaviorism and Skinner's own brand of behaviorism.