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  • Cited by 9
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    This chapter has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Lebens, Samuel 2017. The life of faith as a work of art: a Rabbinic theology of faith. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 81, Issue. , p. 61.

    Duncombe, Matthew 2015. Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories7. Phronesis, Vol. 60, Issue. , p. 436.

    Tabak, Mehmet 2015. Plato's Parmenides Reconsidered. p. 127.

    GILL, MARY LOUISE 2014. Design of the Exercise in Plato’s Parmenides. Dialogue, Vol. 53, Issue. , p. 495.

    2010. A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language. p. 588.

    Horn, Christoph Müller, Jörn Söder, Joachim Schriefl, Anna and Weber, Simon 2009. Platon-Handbuch. p. 61.

    Horn, Christoph Müller, Jörn Söder, Joachim Schriefl, Anna and Weber, Simon 2009. Platon-Handbuch. p. 253.

    Horn, Christoph Müller, Jörn Söder, Joachim Schriefl, Anna and Weber, Simon 2009. Platon-Handbuch. p. 101.

    Robinson, David B. 1999. Textual notes on Plato's Sophist. The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 49, Issue. , p. 139.

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  • Print publication year: 1992
  • Online publication date: May 2006

13 - Plato's Sophist on false statements

Summary

In Plato's dialogue the Sophist, the main interlocutors, the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus, are trying to determine the nature of the sophist. Given that the phenomenon of the sophistic movement is so many-faceted and somewhat amorphous, it is not surprising that the first attempts in the dialogue to get a grip on the elusive reality underlying this phenomenon turn out to be not particularly successful, since they at best capture some superficial feature of the sophist. These features are recapitulated at 231c8-e7. Then, in 232a1ff a renewed attempt is made to capture the sophist; this attempt seems to go more to the heart of the matter, but runs into difficulties whose resolution occupies the remainder of the dialogue. The suggestion is that the sophist has a remarkable ability to represent things in a way that makes this representation, the sophist's statement about things, appear and seem to be true, though, in fact, it is not. This raises a series of difficulties, first alluded to in 235d2, then again in 236c9ff, and spelled out in considerable detail in 236d9ff.

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The Cambridge Companion to Plato
  • Online ISBN: 9781139000574
  • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521430186
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