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  • Cited by 5
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    This (lowercase (translateProductType product.productType)) has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Frayne, Craig 2017. Wittgenstein, Organic Form, and an Orientation to Intercultural Language Games. Journal of Intercultural Communication Research, Vol. 46, Issue. 2, p. 147.


    Gustafsson, Martin 2017. Finding One’s Way Through Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Vol. 2, Issue. , p. 79.

    Ocelák, Radek 2014. Giving Expression to Rules: Grammar as an Activity in Later Wittgenstein. Human Studies, Vol. 37, Issue. 3, p. 351.


    Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle 2013. Beyond Hacker's Wittgenstein: Discussion of HACKER, Peter (2012) “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism”Philosophical Investigations35:1, January 2012, 1-17. Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 36, Issue. 4, p. 355.


    Robjant, David 2012. The Earthy Realism of Plato's Metaphysics, or: What Shall We Do with Iris Murdoch?. Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 35, Issue. 1, p. 43.


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  • Print publication year: 1996
  • Online publication date: May 2006

4 - Philosophy as grammar

Summary

THE PROBLEM ABOUT PHILOSOPHY

It is one of the wonderful paradoxes of our time that the greatest and most stimulating philosopher of the century should identify his work with the stodgiest and dullest of school subjects. It is nonetheless the case that for the last twenty years of his life, the years of his greatest productivity and his profoundest work, Wittgenstein identified what he was doing, and what other philosophers really have been doing and should be doing, with grammar. This perspective is as carefully considered as it is puzzling. It emerged out of earnest and ongoing work, and its implications are felt throughout his later philosophical investigations. Although he settled into this general conception of philosophy soon after his return to Cambridge, probably in 1930, he never gave a clear and orderly account of what he meant. Nor did he succeed, in spite of the centrality of this idea from 1930 right through his last writings, in convincing all those who read his work sympathetically that he meant what he seemed to be saying; both Moore (PO, pp. 46-114) and Feyerabend, for example, expressed profound skepticism about it shortly after his death.

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The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein
  • Online ISBN: 9781139000697
  • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521460255
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