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    Gomes, Anil 2016. Naïve Realism In Kantian Phrase. Mind, p. fzw009.

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  • Print publication year: 2003
  • Online publication date: March 2008

41 - Sensible appearances

from 10 - Knowledge, language, and the end of metaphysics
Summary
The question of realism is intertwined with the discussion of sense perception in much early-twentieth-century English-speaking philosophy. Sense-data are much discussed by many philosophers in the first half of the twentieth century, though few actually advocated the theory. Sense-datum theorists claim that when someone senses, he or she is given a sense-datum in their experience. Within these terms, the problem of perception then becomes that of determining what the relation is between the sense-datum and any material object of perception. On the whole, these authors propose non-physical sense-data as the direct objects of sense without denying that we also sense physical objects. In Moore's case, throughout his writings, the sense-datum theory is combined with a robust and common-sense realism about the ordinary world. One problematic question within both the phenomenological tradition and later interpretations is whether the phenomenologists can, or do, embrace realism about the perceived world.
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The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870–1945
  • Online ISBN: 9781139053563
  • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521591041
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