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72 - Fairness, principle of

from F

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2015

Jon Mandle
Affiliation:
State University of New York, Albany
David A. Reidy
Affiliation:
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
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Summary

Rawls’s theory of justice primarily concerns the morality of institutions and secondarily the morality of conduct under them. A central theme of the latter is that “We are not to gain from the cooperative efforts of others without doing our fair share” (TJ 96.) This idea, its implications and Rawls’s terminology evolve as his theory of justice develops. In 1964 Rawls presented what he then called “the duty of fair play” as the ground of a widely applicable “moral obligation to obey the law” (CP 117–128), whereas in 1971 “the principle of fairness” is said to ground an obligation of obedience to law that applies to only a limited subset of citizens (TJ 308–312). These changes are related to Rawls’s distinguishing “obligations,” based on fairness and incurred by voluntary actions, from “natural duties,” which obtain independently of anyone’s voluntary acts (TJ 96).

In “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play,” Rawls says that fair play calls for compliance with the rules of an institution when (1) the institution is a “mutually beneicial and just scheme of social cooperation”; (2) compliance with its rules involves some sacriice (if only some restriction on one’s liberty); (3) the relevant beneits are created by general compliance with its rules; (4) free-riding is possible because it is possible for some to enjoy the benefits without complying; and (5) one has “accepted” such beneits (CP 122f.). In A Theory of Justice, Rawls says that the principle of fairness calls for compliance with institutional rules under similar conditions, except that Rawls modiies the last condition so that (5) one is under an obligation to do what the rules require if one has not merely accepted (perhaps only passively received) such beneits but welcomes them and intends to continue accepting them or has actually sought them (TJ 301f.).

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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