While the devastating effects of systemic risk are well known, the quantification of losses due to systemic risk amplification mechanisms (SRA-losses) due to interactions between banks and non-banks in a financial system, and their incorporation into macroprudential stress-testing frameworks (MaPST) remains challenging. We present a novel approach to incorporate SRA-losses into MaPST. Importantly, the framework estimates SRA-losses based on readily available supervisory and market information without the need of highly granular cross-exposure supervisory information, which is not available in many countries. Moreover, since the framework incorporates market perceptions of direct and indirect contagion; SRA-losses can be quantified without the need to assume ex-ante market structures and agents’ behaviors, which can change in unknown manners in periods of distress. The framework extends Segoviano and Goodhart’s banking stability indicators and incorporates an asset pricing model to quantify SRA-losses and identify contagion paths, making possible the quantification of the likelihood and intensity of contagion events involving specific or multiple entities (banks and non-banks) in a financial system.