Cicero: On Moral Ends

(1) If pleasure lacked such tenacious advocates, Brutus, and spoke for herself, I think the previous book would compel her to concede defeat to real worth. How shameless she would be to resist virtue any longer, to prefer what is pleasant to what is good, or to contend that bodily enjoyment and the mental delight that it causes are of more value than a steadfast seriousness of purpose.

So let us dismiss her and order her to stay within her own borders. We do not want the rigour of our debate to be hampered by her seductive charms. (2) We must investigate where that supreme good that we want to discover is to be found. Pleasure has been eliminated from the inquiry, and pretty much the same objections hold against those who maintained that the ultimate good was freedom from pain. Indeed no good should be declared supreme if it is lacking in virtue, since nothing can be superior to that.

We were forceful enough in our debate with Torquatus. But a still fiercer struggle with the Stoics is at hand. The topic of pleasure militates against really sharp or profound discussion. Those who defend pleasure are not well versed in argument, and her opponents are confronting a case that is not hard to refute. (3) Even Epicurus himself said that pleasure is not a matter for argument, since the criterion for judging pleasure is located in the senses.