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  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Collective Preference and Choice
  • Cited by 9
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
June 2012
Print publication year:
2009
Online ISBN:
9780511803871
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511803871
Subjects:
Economics, Microeconomics, Politics and International Relations, Comparative Politics
Information

Book description

Collective decision-making is a familiar feature of our social, political, and economic lives. It ranges from the relatively trivial (e.g. the choice of the next family car) to the globally significant (e.g. whether or not a country should go to war). Yet, whether trivial or globally significant, such decisions involve a number of challenging problems. These problems arise in the standard social choice setting, where individuals differ in their preferences. They also arise in the standard decision-making setting, where individuals share the same preferences, but differ in their decisional capabilities. The distinctive feature of Collective Preference and Choice is that it looks at classical aggregation problems that arise in three closely related areas: social choice theory, voting theory, and group decision-making under uncertainty. Using a series of exercises and examples, the book explains these problems with reference to a number of important contributions to the study of collective decision-making.

Reviews

‘This is a first rate book, covering basic social choice theory (Arrow, Sen, Condorcet, Borda, etc.), as well as group choice when individuals seek the same objective but disagree on how to bring it about - an area in which Shmuel Nitzan himself has made seminal contributions. The material is well presented. This lucid treatment is ideal for newcomers to the field, but it will also be a valuable resource for graduate students. For every page of text there is half a page of exercises with solutions.’

Donald Campbell - College of William and Mary

‘Written by one of the major contributors to the field, this book is an excellent introduction to social choice. Covering the basic questions of the definition and elicitation of social choice, the book will be a great resource for students of economics and political science, as well as for researchers in social science, computer science, and related fields.’

Itzhak Gilboa - Tel Aviv University and HEC, Paris

‘Shmuel Nitzan is well-known to all scholars and students of social choice theory for his important articles published in leading outlets of the profession. His new book incorporates and expands upon those contributions in a very accessible manner. It contains much material not found in other textbooks in the field. Professor Nitzan’s long experience as a teacher is pleasantly visible from the very beginning of the text. Each chapter is succinctly and competently summarized. A very nice instructional touch is added to the book by solved exercises at the end of each chapter. This makes the book most useful not only in the classroom, but also in independent study.’

Hannu Nurmi - University of Turku

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Contents

Contents
References
Bibliography
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