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  • Cited by 9
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    Yang, Yueh-Ping 2016. Legal Thoughts between the East and the West in the Multilevel Legal Order. p. 445.

    NISHIOKA, Susumu 2014. The Review on the ‘Politics of the Corporate Governance’:. The Annuals of Japanese Political Science Association, Vol. 65, Issue. 2, p. 2_110.

    Böhm, Falko Bollen, Laury H. and Hassink, Harold F. 2013. Spotlight on the Design of European Audit Committees: A Comparative Descriptive Study. International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 17, Issue. 2, p. 138.

    Cowton, Christopher J. 2011. Putting Creditors in Their Rightful Place: Corporate Governance and Business Ethics in the Light of Limited Liability. Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 102, Issue. S1, p. 21.

    Colpan, Asli M. Yoshikawa, Toru Hikino, Takashi and Del Brio, Esther B. 2011. Shareholder Heterogeneity and Conflicting Goals: Strategic Investments in the Japanese Electronics Industry. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 48, Issue. 3, p. 591.

    SHRIEVES, RONALD E. DAHL, DREW and SPIVEY, MICHAEL F. 2010. Capital Market Regimes and Bank Structure in Europe. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 42, Issue. 6, p. 1073.

    Yoshikawa, Toru and Rasheed, Abdul A. 2009. Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical Review and Future Directions. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 17, Issue. 3, p. 388.

    Yoshikawa, Toru Tsui-Auch, Lai Si and McGuire, Jean 2007. Corporate Governance Reform as Institutional Innovation: The Case of Japan. Organization Science, Vol. 18, Issue. 6, p. 973.

    Clift, Ben 2007. French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy: Mechanisms of Change and Hybridisation within Models of Capitalism. Political Studies, Vol. 55, Issue. 3, p. 546.

  • Print publication year: 2004
  • Online publication date: March 2010

4 - Globalizing corporate governance: convergence of form or function


Globalization has led to a remarkable resurgence in the study of comparative corporate governance. This area of scholarship had been largely the domain of taxonomists, intent on cataloguing the central characteristics of national corporate governance systems, and then classifying different systems based on the specified attributes. The result was an interesting, if perhaps somewhat dry, enterprise. We learned that national corporate governance systems differed dramatically along a number of seemingly important dimensions. Some corporate governance systems, notably those of the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries, are built on the foundation of a stock market-centered capital market. Other systems, like those of Germany and Japan, rest on a bank-centered capital market. Some systems are characterized by large groupings of related corporations, like the Japanese keiretsu, Korean chaebol, or European holding company structures. Still others are notable for concentrated family control of large businesses, including Canada, Italy and, notably, Germany. Management styles also differ across national systems. In the United States and France, managerial power is concentrated, by practice in the US and with statutory support in France, in an imperial-style American chief executive officer or French présidente directeur générale.

The explosive decompression of trade barriers that gave rise to global competition also had an impact on academics. We learned that the institutions of all national systems were shaped not only by efficiency, but also by history and politics.

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Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance
  • Online ISBN: 9780511665905
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