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Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Isaac Levi
Affiliation:
Columbia University, New York
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Summary

Rationality, according to some, is an excess of reasonableness. We should be rational enough to confront the problems of life; but there is no need to go whole hog. Indeed, doing so is something of a vice.

Obsessive behavior that insists on computing to the 100th decimal place when the demands of the situation call for determining no more than 2, may, indeed, be an obstacle to effective agency. We need not explicitly or consciously seek to identify the implications of our beliefs and values any further than is required in order to address the problems we currently anticipate facing. But defenders of rationality do not say otherwise when they claim that rational agents ought to recognize the implications of their beliefs and values. Obviously, this obligation applies “when and to the extent that the need arises.” However, there is no upper bound on how complex the problems are that we may need to face. As a consequence, it is always desirable to improve our capacities to confront ever more sophisticated tasks. Advocates of reasonableness seem to deny or overlook this point.

Such denial would make sense if we led lives so simple that we could get by without taxing our ratiocinative capacities. There would then be no need to improve our capacities to reason well, for the capacities of human agents would never be stretched to the limit by the complexities of life and nature.

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Chapter
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The Covenant of Reason
Rationality and the Commitments of Thought
, pp. vii - xiv
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1997

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  • Introduction
  • Isaac Levi, Columbia University, New York
  • Book: The Covenant of Reason
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173032.001
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  • Introduction
  • Isaac Levi, Columbia University, New York
  • Book: The Covenant of Reason
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173032.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
  • Isaac Levi, Columbia University, New York
  • Book: The Covenant of Reason
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173032.001
Available formats
×