Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-42gr6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-19T21:03:50.503Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2009

Gregory A. Huber
Affiliation:
Yale University, Connecticut
Get access

Summary

Bureaucrats are policy-minded entrepreneurs who make strategic choices governed by both the constraints imposed by the political environment and the need to control their subordinates. Bureaucratic leaders can use their authority to change policy so long as they can avoid being rebuked by coalitions sufficiently powerful to compel changes in their behavior. Given this ongoing threat, bureaucratic leaders have incentives to seek politically efficient solutions in pursuit of their policy goals. In the enforcement context, a strategy that achieves these ends with minimal disadvantage is strategic neutrality, which combines the careful calibration of centrally directed discretionary decisions with tight control of subordinates.

In the case of the OSH Act, despite pressure from individual industries, businesses, and localities (and the politicians acting on behalf of them), OSHA has managed to implement the law with remarkable geographic and firm-by-firm consistency. OSHA does not tailor local or individual enforcement to the wishes of powerful elected officials or to the demands of any single interest group. This neutrality persists despite the strong local pressures on the agency and its dispersed workforce. This outcome points to the capability of bureaucratic leaders to insulate their subordinates from external political pressures. OSHA both recruits those motivated to police employer behavior and actively seeks to disrupt potential linkages between inspectors and interest groups or elected officials. The agency also pushes its subordinates to work hard, creating incentives that motivate uniform law enforcement.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality
Interests and Influence in Governmental Regulation of Occupational Safety
, pp. 220 - 238
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Conclusion
  • Gregory A. Huber, Yale University, Connecticut
  • Book: The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality
  • Online publication: 27 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511509841.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Conclusion
  • Gregory A. Huber, Yale University, Connecticut
  • Book: The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality
  • Online publication: 27 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511509841.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • Gregory A. Huber, Yale University, Connecticut
  • Book: The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality
  • Online publication: 27 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511509841.006
Available formats
×