We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
CONVENTION AND INDIVIDUAL DECISION (384C–385B)
First statement (384ce)
Hermogenes begins to state his own views politely contradicting Cratylus:
he. Well, Socrates, though I have often discussed both with Cratylus here and with many others, I cannot be persuaded that there is any other correctness of a name than convention and agreement [συνθήκη καὶ ὁμολογία]. For it seems to me that, whatever name one imposes on something, this is its correct name [ὅτι ἄν τίς τῳ θῆται ὄνομα, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὀρθόν]; and that, if one changes it by imposing another one again, and does not call the thing by the former name any more [καὶ ἂν αὖθίς γε ἕτερον μεταθῆται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μηκέτι καλῇ], the new name is no less correct than the old, as when we change the name of our slaves. For no name belongs by nature to anything [οὐ γὰρ φύσει ἑκάστῳ πεφυκέναι ὄνομα οὐδὲν οὐδενί], but in virtue of the custom and habit of those who made names into habits and those who call things by them [ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει τῶν ἐθισάντων τε καὶ καλούντων].
The core of Hermogenes' self-presentation can be divided into three sentences:
(H1) ‘I cannot … agreement’ (c11–d2),
(H2) ‘It seems to me … our slaves’ (d2–5),
(H3) ‘No name … call things’ (d5–7).
Let us examine each sentence more closely.
(H1) asserts that the correctness of the name consists in convention (συνθήκη) and agreement (ὁμολογία).
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this book to your organisation's collection.