As we encountered in Chapter 4, the use of plebiscites in nondemocratic regimes is typically motivated by the creation or maintenance of the illusion of an existing democratic process (both within and outside the country). Additionally, plebiscites in non-democracies are employed to cement a psychological and emotional bond between the regime and the population through its mobilization. Yet facultative plebiscites and other types of MDDs can also be used by “low intensity” democracies, those that – despite being usually included in the democratic realm by most procedural criteria – present with shortcomings in terms of both horizontal and vertical accountability.

As a rule, the more often facultative (unregulated) plebiscites are used by a given regime, the more evident are the signs that a low-intensity, low-quality democratic life exists in that particular country. However, a plebiscitarian atmosphere in a country is not necessarily due uniquely to the megalomaniacal propensity of a specific leader. Frankly, leaders tend to use all the prerogatives at their disposal to advance their political agendas – this is rational and expected. The question is why leaders have the leeway to use those prerogatives without the checks and balances that characterize a functioning representative democracy.

Although most new, posttransitional Latin American constitutions contain some kind of MDD, the literature shows an evident tension regarding their causes. In short, the question remains open: Is the systematic use of MDDs the cause or the consequence of weak representative institutions?