Chapter 3 argued for a view of diplomatic recognition as an informal regime governed by its own set of norms, legal as well as political, that historically have contributed to the maintenance of a stable order in the international system. Because the practice of recognition originates with states and serves to protect their interests, it is an inherently conservative institution. Outside of decolonisation states are reluctant to confer recognition on new claimants unless their claims are undisputed, for in the absence of terrae nullius (territories belonging to no one) recognition can only be achieved at the expense of existing states, and the dismemberment of one state is perceived to pose a threat to the integrity of all states as well as to weaken the foundations of the state-based international order. Although the EC's policy with regard to Yugoslavia might seem to contradict this view – to reflect instead an incautious and even subversive use of recognition – the EC, we have seen, sought to contain the disruptive effects of its actions by interpreting them so narrowly as to have limited application to other states. Statehood for Croatia thus would not mean statehood for, say, Spain's Catalonia or Russia's Chechnya.

There is another way in which the practice of recognition, rather than serving to ensure stability, can be disruptive of the established order, and that is in its potential for exacerbating the violence that may accompany the creation of a new state, particularly if the parent state is contesting and seeking to suppress the emergence of the entity.