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4 - Some nonreasons for nonrealism about economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2009

Uskali Mäki
Affiliation:
Professor of Philosophy of Science Erasmus University of Rotterdam; Academic Director Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE), The Netherlands
Uskali Mäki
Affiliation:
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
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Summary

Introduction

Many participants in the debate over the current state and recent developments of economics make claims that are unrefined, simplistic, often exaggerated. This is understandable: the stakes are high, the issues trigger emotional responses, and few participants are motivated or equipped to seek more nuanced analyses. To assert, or to deny, that economics as a scientific discipline or a particular part of it (such as a model) is about reality – or refers to reality, represents it, is true about it, or is truthlike about it – is to make a very complex and highly ambiguous claim. The disputants often make claims that have parallels in the philosophical controversy between scientific realists and their opponents, or at any rate those claims can be partly analyzed in terms of some of the arguments presented in this philosophical controversy. The question addressed here is whether realism about economics is a viable position. The argument proceeds by way of refuting a number of arguments against realism about economics. I suggest a genuine controversy over the factuality of any particular strand or piece of economics requires realism as a general interpretation of economics – or at any rate requires debunking the anti-realist arguments discussed below.

“The issue of realism” as most economists would recognize it, is not exactly the issue of realism as philosophers recognize it.

Type
Chapter
Information
Fact and Fiction in Economics
Models, Realism and Social Construction
, pp. 90 - 104
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2002

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References

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Cairnes, John Eliot (1875). The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy. London: Macmillan
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Mäki, Uskali (1992b). The market as an isolated causal process: a metaphysical ground for realism, in Bruce Caldwell and Stephan Boehm (eds.), Austrian Economics: Tensions and New Developments. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 35–59
Mäki, Uskali (1993a). Social theories of science and the fate of institutionalism in economics, in Uskali Mäki, Bo Gustafsson, and Christian Knudsen (eds.), Rationality, Institutions and Economic Methodology. London: Routledge, 76–109
Mäki, Uskali (1993b). Two philosophies of the rhetoric of economics, in Willie Henderson, Tony Dudley-Evans, and Roger Backhouse (eds.), Economics and Language. London: Routledge, 23–50
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Mäki, Uskali (1998a). Is Coase a realist?, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 28, 5–31CrossRef
Mäki, Uskali (1998b). Aspects of realism about economics, Theoria, 13, 301–319
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Mäki, Uskali (2001). Realisms and their opponents, in Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 19. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 12815–12821CrossRef
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  • Some nonreasons for nonrealism about economics
    • By Uskali Mäki, Professor of Philosophy of Science Erasmus University of Rotterdam; Academic Director Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE), The Netherlands
  • Edited by Uskali Mäki, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
  • Book: Fact and Fiction in Economics
  • Online publication: 22 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493317.005
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  • Some nonreasons for nonrealism about economics
    • By Uskali Mäki, Professor of Philosophy of Science Erasmus University of Rotterdam; Academic Director Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE), The Netherlands
  • Edited by Uskali Mäki, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
  • Book: Fact and Fiction in Economics
  • Online publication: 22 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493317.005
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Some nonreasons for nonrealism about economics
    • By Uskali Mäki, Professor of Philosophy of Science Erasmus University of Rotterdam; Academic Director Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE), The Netherlands
  • Edited by Uskali Mäki, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
  • Book: Fact and Fiction in Economics
  • Online publication: 22 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493317.005
Available formats
×