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Chapter 8 - Saving Aristotle's appearances

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2013

Martha C. Nussbaum
Martha C. Nussbaum
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
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Summary

At the beginning of Book vii of the Nicomachean Ethics, just before his discussion of akrasia, Aristotle pauses to make some observations about his philosophical method:

Here, as in all other cases, we must set down the appearances (phainomena) and, first working through the puzzles (diaporēsantas), in this way go on to show, if possible, the truth of all the beliefs we hold (ta endoxa) about these experiences; and, if this is not possible, the truth of the greatest number and the most authoritative. For if the difficulties are resolved and the beliefs (endoxa) are left in place, we will have done enough showing.

(1145b1ff.)

Aristotle tells us that his method, ‘here as in all other cases’, is to set down what he calls phainomena, and what we shall translate as ‘the appearances’. Proper philosophical method is committed to and limited by these. If we work through the difficulties with which the phainomena confront us and leave the greatest number and the most basic intact, we will have gone as far as philosophy can, or should, go.

This theoretical remark is closely followed by an application of the method. Aristotle first reports some of our most common beliefs and sayings about akrasia, concluding his summary with the words, ‘These, then, are the things we say (ta legomena)’ (1145b20). Next he presents the Socratic view that nobody does wrong willingly: we choose the lesser good only as a result of ignorance.

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The Fragility of Goodness
Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy
 , pp. 240 - 263
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2001

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