The French War on Al Qa'ida in Africa

France's six-month attempt to lead the Africans from behind into a military action against al Qa'ida collapsed in a few short days in early January 2013 when several hundred jihadists breached the Niger Bend in an armed convoy and sped toward Bamako. For three days, French officials had watched anxiously from Paris as hundreds of jihadists assembled in their pickup trucks along the Niger. The French hoped the jihadists would stay in the north, and wondered what Ag Ghali and his allies might possibly expect to accomplish with an attack on Mali's capital in such small numbers. When the jihadists suddenly crossed the river and headed south, the attack came as a surprise for many onlookers, and a frightening one. Even if it would be almost impossible for a few hundred modestly armed jihadists to hold the city, the Malian military was torn and enfeebled, and the African force was far from ready to deploy. This left Bamako's population of more than one million defenseless against some of the most ruthless terrorists in Africa.

But if the jihadist thrust across the Niger River was dangerous it was also a classic example of an opportunity enfolded in a crisis. By crossing the river, the jihadists had made what many French officials would later come to see as their first big strategic error: The audacious threat to the capital not only gave France cause to intervene directly, it also openly exposed the jihadists to direct and violent strikes by the French military. The French seized the opportunity and struck the enemy with the force of France's modern military machine, plunging themselves headlong into their largest military operation in Africa in half a century.

THE JIHADIST ADVANCE ON BAMAKO

In early January, controversy was brewing among the leaders of the various jihadist groups that now occupied northern Mali. With the UN Security Council resolution passed, the possibility of a foreign intervention was now real. Ag Ghali, eventually backed by his al Qa'ida allies, started pushing for rapid action to seize Bamako, in order to thwart any international action. But in Gao, Mujao leader Abu Kheirou resisted. French intelligence services were watching these deliberations. Beginning on January 4, it was clear something was up, even if many observers still thought the jihadists would never be bold enough to cross the river.