Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-xtgtn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-23T15:06:58.930Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Individual preference and individual choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 March 2010

Get access

Summary

This chapter focuses on the notation and definitions required to represent the theoretical primitives of formal theory – alternatives, outcomes, and preferences. Although this focus may make reading difficult for those who are encountering these ideas for the first time, this material must be mastered if formal political theory is to be understood in more than a superficial way.

We begin with two assumptions: methodological individualism and purposeful action. Methodological individualism holds that we can understand social processes and outcomes in terms of people's preferences and choices. This assumption may seem strange to the student of politics, who is concerned primarily with collectivities such as interest groups, political parties, or legislatures, and for whom the most useful explanatory concepts assume a group consciousness. Such concepts, though, are generally little more than journalistic conveniences that afford us the luxury of not having to delve into the complexities of organizations and institutions. But interest groups cannot lobby: Only their members can opportune legislators. Similarly, a legislature cannot “hold” a norm: Only its members can share a consensus about acceptable standards of action and penalties for violations of those standards.

Obviously, it is convenient to speak of “society preferring clean air,” “firms maximizing profits,” or “the Office of Management and Budget setting national economic policy.” Furthermore, no one should dispute that social interaction conditions people's preferences and choices. The assumption of methodological individualism is but a reminder that only people choose, prefer, share goals, learn, and so on, and that all explanations and descriptions of group action, if they are theoretically sound, ultimately must be understandable in terms of individual choice.

Type
Chapter
Information
Game Theory and Political Theory
An Introduction
, pp. 1 - 52
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1986

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×