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God and Phenomenal Consciousness
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  • Cited by 6
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    This book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    O’Brien, Dan 2018. Encyclopedia of Psychology and Religion. p. 1.

    Millière, Raphaël 2014. Is God a zombie? Divine consciousness and omnipresence. International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 75, Issue. 1, p. 38.

    Hill, Scott 2014. Giving up omnipotence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 44, Issue. 1, p. 97.

    Byerly, T. Ryan 2014. Restricted Omniscience and Ways of Knowing. Sophia, Vol. 53, Issue. 4, p. 427.

    Cray, Wesley D. 2011. Omniscience and worthiness of worship. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 70, Issue. 2, p. 147.

    Nagasawa, Yujin 2010. The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis, Vol. 72, Issue. 1, p. 37.

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Book description

In God and Phenomenal Consciousness, Yujin Nagasawa bridges debates in two distinct areas of philosophy: the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. First, he introduces some of the most powerful arguments against the existence of God and provides objections to them. He then presents a parallel structure between these arguments and influential arguments offered by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness. By appealing to this structure, Nagasawa constructs novel objections to Jackson's and Nagel's arguments. Finally, he derives, from the failure of these arguments, a unique metaphysical thesis, which he calls 'non-theoretical physicalism'. Through this thesis, he shows that although this world is entirely physical, there are physical facts that cannot be captured even by complete theories of the physical sciences.

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