Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-22dnz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T12:46:48.443Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - Beyond Nature

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Erik J. Wielenberg
Affiliation:
DePauw University, Indiana
Get access

Summary

INTRODUCTION

According to Lewis, “a sane man accepts or rejects any statement, not because he wants to or does not want to, but because the evidence seems to him good or bad.” This statement encapsulates Lewis's approach to religion: Follow the evidence. The overarching project of Lewis's Christian writings is to make the case that the evidence leads to Christianity. In the previous chapter, we examined Lewis's attempt to show that the suffering we find in the universe does not constitute decisive evidence against the existence of God. In this chapter and the next, we turn our attention to Lewis's positive case for the truth of Christianity.

It is helpful to view this case as having two main components. The first component consists of arguments for the claim that there is, in addition to the natural, physical universe that we perceive with our senses, some transcendent being, a Higher Power that created the natural universe and is “more like a mind than it is like anything else we know.” Lewis's writings suggest three main arguments for this conclusion or something like it. As Lewis is well aware, establishing such a conclusion does not establish the truth of Christianity, which adds to this claim a particular conception of the nature of this Higher Power as well as a host of additional theological and historical claims.

Type
Chapter
Information
God and the Reach of Reason
C. S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell
, pp. 56 - 120
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Beyond Nature
  • Erik J. Wielenberg, DePauw University, Indiana
  • Book: God and the Reach of Reason
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167444.003
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Beyond Nature
  • Erik J. Wielenberg, DePauw University, Indiana
  • Book: God and the Reach of Reason
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167444.003
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Beyond Nature
  • Erik J. Wielenberg, DePauw University, Indiana
  • Book: God and the Reach of Reason
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167444.003
Available formats
×