Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics

Introduction

The previous chapter set out to show that Nietzsche's philosophy can best be understood as an assault on metaphysics. By metaphysics Nietzsche means a mode of thought which understands the world in terms of discrete entities and conceptual oppositions, the main example of which is the opposition between appearance and reality ‘in itself’. In Nietzsche's view, philosophers are tempted into believing in such oppositions by language, particularly by the grammatical and logical distinction between subject and predicate. In chapter 1 it was suggested that Hegel could be seen as an ally of Nietzsche in his critique of metaphysics. The purpose of the present chapter, therefore, is to show to what extent this view of Hegel is appropriate.

The most obvious point of similarity with Nietzsche in Hegel's philosophy is his critique in the Phenomenology of the ‘unhappy consciousness’, the alienated mode of consciousness which is at odds with the world of transience and finitude and which seeks refuge in an ideal ‘beyond’. But since a comparison of Hegel's treatment of the ‘unhappy consciousness’ and Nietzsche's treatment of ‘slave morality’ has already been undertaken by M. Greene, and was discussed in chapter 1, we will not repeat that discussion here. A more accessible discussion of the phenomenon of the ‘unhappy consciousness’ is to be found, however, in Hegel's treatment of Judaism in the lectures on the philosophy of history and the philosophy of religion, and it is that which we shall look at briefly first of all.