My concluding remarks consist of two parts: First, I will summarize once more the central results of the investigation, presenting Hegel's theory of action in overview. I will then give a brief summary of a central area of action-theory about which Hegel says nothing in the Philosophy of Right: the explanation of action. The question that arises from this research area is which position Hegel adopts with regard to the mind-body problem (a theme that demands a study of its own). I will therefore only sketch briefly the extent to which Hegel's theory of action and his solution of the mind-body problem are compatible.

Results

For Hegel, actions are “expressions of the subjective will.” That is, they are events for which it is essential that they be known under a specific perspective/description. This essential characteristic of action-events distinguishes them from other events. Hegel understands the inner perspective of the agent as an action-specific belief, whose logical form he analyzes (in R §110). He unfolds the self-ascriptive character of the agent's belief and provides the universal determination of the content of this belief: The agent understands his act (at the time of the action) as the realization of a freely chosen end (cf. Chapter 2). At the heart of the theory of action that Hegel develops in the Philosophy of Right is the distinction between the action-event and its description; Hegel is clearly aware that action-events are registered as actions only under certain descriptions.