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3 - Economics – The Proper Valuation of Security and Environment

from Part I - Multidisciplinary Perspectives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 June 2019

Marc Ozawa
Affiliation:
Energy Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge
Jonathan Chaplin
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
Michael Pollitt
Affiliation:
Judge Business School, Cambridge
David Reiner
Affiliation:
Judge Business School, Cambridge
Paul Warde
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
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Summary

Environmental quality is a non-excludable public good in that good quality for one is good for all; security may have similar characteristics. The resulting market failures mean that without remedies markets will undersupply. Each consumer has a different valuation that cannot readily be revealed, often requiring public action to remedy. Climate change is the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen, with global long-lasting impacts requiring collective action best addressed by credible global rising carbon taxes that will be challenging to deliver. Policy needs to choose instruments well targeted to objectives, correcting market failures through taxes or standard setting, leaving distributional justice to the tax and benefit system. This chapter argues that the concept of market completeness is helpful in designing appropriate energy policies to address both problems.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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