Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-tj2md Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T10:16:35.201Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Mark S. Manger
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
Get access

Summary

In late September 2006, a short letter arrived at the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization in Geneva that formally announced the entry into force of the United States–Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, bringing the number of notified trade accords to 200. With every preferential trade agreement (PTA) – an arrangement that liberalizes trade between member states only – the principles of multilateralism and non-discrimination in international trade as embodied by the World Trade Organization (WTO) lose more relevance. When the letter was received, already more than half of global commerce was conducted under the rules of one PTA or another.

How different the world of international trade diplomacy looked only twelve years earlier. After almost eight years of negotiations, ministers of 109 countries shook hands in Marrakesh on April 15, 1994, on the occasion of the signature of the most ambitious multilateral trade agreement in history. The final deal brought agriculture into the domain of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and created the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a GATT counterpart for services, by then making up a third of global commerce. Most importantly, it established the World Trade Organization itself, a formal international institution with its own staff and seat in Geneva (Barton et al. 2006: 93).

The mood was euphoric. US Vice-President Al Gore, who had flown in to address the meeting, called the deal “truly momentous.”

Type
Chapter
Information
Investing in Protection
The Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements between North and South
, pp. 1 - 26
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Introduction
  • Mark S. Manger, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: Investing in Protection
  • Online publication: 08 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511635311.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Introduction
  • Mark S. Manger, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: Investing in Protection
  • Online publication: 08 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511635311.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
  • Mark S. Manger, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: Investing in Protection
  • Online publication: 08 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511635311.002
Available formats
×