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Van Eekert, Geert
2017.
Remarks on Immanuel Kant’s assessment of the use of the thesis of innate evil in moral philosophy (Religion, 6:50-51).
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology,
Vol. 78,
Issue. 4-5,
p.
348.
In the Doctrine of Virtue, the apparently unambiguous enemy of virtue is the inclinations, understood as a natural force. This chapter compares the two scenarios: inclinations, then a particular state of a free, rational being, as the enemy of virtue. It distinguishes Kantian and Aristotelian virtue more clearly. Inclinations are "impulses of nature", operating according to the laws of the natural world. The relationship of virtue to freedom can be best understood by exploring Kant's idea of "inner freedom". Kant suggests that vicious acts occur when the strength of one's natural inclinations overwhelms the strength of one's inner freedom. In the Groundwork, Kant describes a person tempted, through a process of rationalization, perversion, or corruption, to avert his eyes from the categorical demands of morality. Vicious acts are perverse realizations of freedom, a turning of the strength of freedom on its head as weakness.