What is it about the management of Jacobean finance that constitutes a failure of kingship and governance rather than simply the functional break-down of an obsolete and antiquated financial system? It is hardly surprising that a study which focuses on the intersection of politics and finance will conclude that responsibility lay with the individuals practising the art of governance. None of the regimes that James constructed was able to avoid failure in key aspects of kingship and governance which had little to do with administration: James and his governors did not make or sustain effective policy with the notable exceptions of impositions and the 1617–18 reform drive. This was certainly not for lack of trying. No one underestimates the amount of labour that went into the search for a financial settlement, nor was there ever a shortage of counsel on finance. Perhaps in making the case for political failure this is the crux of the matter. James's receptivity to counsel and his correspondingly fluid policy-making process placed upon himself and his governors enormous demands to evaluate counsel in the course of making profitable decisions. This flexible, accessible, personal kingship had much to recommend it, but it served James badly in fiscal policy. This does not, however, replace one brand of functional breakdown with another. On the contrary, James's kingship proved adaptable throughout his reign. What remained unchanged was James's responsibility for the agenda of governance, his political reading of finance and the decisions made to serve those ends. This suggests that the failure of Jacobean finance ultimately centres on the failure of counsel: its content, articulation and use by the king and his governors in developing a workable consensus on policy.