Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-wq2xx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-23T12:46:04.304Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Marital commitment and the legal regulation of divorce

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2009

Elizabeth S. Scott
Affiliation:
Professor of Law University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA
Antony W. Dnes
Affiliation:
University of Hertfordshire
Robert Rowthorn
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
Get access

Summary

The question of the appropriate role of law in regulating marriage and divorce is the subject of much controversy in the United States – a raging battle of the “Culture Wars” (Hunter, 1991). On one side are social conservatives, who view divorce and family instability as an important source of societal decline. These advocates of “family values” adopt a somewhat punitive tone, arguing that the family can be saved only if the government restricts divorce, by reinstituting fault grounds and discouraging unhappy spouses from selfishly defecting from their responsibilities. Liberals tend to oppose all restrictions on divorce, partly on the ground that they will not be effective in promoting family stability or enhancing the welfare of children. More importantly perhaps, liberals challenge what they view as oppressive constraints on individual freedom.

Recently, conservatives have been encouraged by the introduction of covenant marriage statutes in a few US states. These laws allow couples to choose a marriage option that involves a legal commitment more binding than is allowed under conventional no-fault divorce law. Some proponents of covenant marriage are hopeful that it is part of a trend toward more restrictive divorce reforms – a return to a regime in which divorce is conditioned on fault. Not surprisingly, many liberals view covenant marriage with alarm – for the same reason that conservatives favor these laws.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2002

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ainslie, George (1975), “Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse Control,” Psychological Bulletin, 82, 463CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Amato, Paul and Allen Booth (1997), A Generation at Risk: Growing up in an Era of Family Upheaval, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
American Law Institute (1999), “Compensatory Spousal Payments,” Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Philadelphia, PA: ALI
Baker, Lynn and Robert, Emery (1993), “When Every Relationship Is above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage,” Law and Human Behavior, 17, 993CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bishop, William (1984), “‘Is He Married?’ Marriage as Information,” University of Toronto Law Journal, 34, 245–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eggars, Dave (2000), “Intimacies,” New York Times Magazine, 5 July, 76–7Google Scholar
Elster, Jon (1979), Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Emery, Robert (1982), “Interparental Conflict and the Children of Discord and Divorce,” Psychological Bulletin, 92, 310CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Festinger, Leon (1957), A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Evanston, IL: Row Peterson
Festinger, Leon (1964), Conflict, Decision and Dissonance, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
Glendon, Mary Anne (1984), “Family Law Reform in the 1980s,” Louisiana Law Review, 44, 1553Google Scholar
Haas, Theodore F. (1988) “The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce,” North Carolina Law Review, 66, 879Google Scholar
Hunter, James (1991), Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America, New York: Basic Books
Jacob, Herbert (1988), The Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce Law in the United States, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Parfit, Derek (1973), “Later Selves and Moral Principles.” in A. Montfiere (ed.), Philosophy and Personal Relations, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 137CrossRef
Posner, Eric (1999), “Family Law and Social Norms,” in Frank Buckley (ed.), The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 256
Rasmusen, Eric and Stake, Jeffrey E. (1998), “Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract,” Indiana Law Journal, 73, 454–502Google Scholar
Schelling, Thomas (1984), “Self Command in Practice and in a Theory of Rational Choice,” American Economic Review, 74, 1Google Scholar
Schneider, Carl (1984), “Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law,” Michigan Law Review, 83, 1803CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scott, Elizabeth S. (1990), “Rational Decision-making about Marriage and Divorce,” Virginia Law Review, 76, 9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scott, Elizabeth S. (2000), “Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage,” Virginia Law Review, 86, 1901CrossRef
Scott, Elizabeth S. and Scott, Robert E. (1998), “Marriage as Relational Contract,” Virginia Law Review, 84, 1225CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scott, Robert and Douglas Leslie (1997), Contract Law and Theory, 2nd edn, Charlottesville, VA: Michie Press
Strotz, R. H. (1955–6), “Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization,” Review of Economic Studies, 23, 165CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trebilock, Michael (1999), “Marriage as a Signal,” in Frank Buckley (ed). The Fall and Rise of freedom of Contract, durham, NC: Duke University press, 245
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahnemann (1982), “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” in D. Kahnemann, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky (eds.). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×