Staff education, doctrine and discussion, before the war

We have seen that various advances were made in the Intelligence Department and the associated staff during the decade or so before the First World War, what with the broadening of the existing organisation, and the attempts to improve direction and co-ordination. Properly to assess the achievement, however, we must take account of what hindsight shows us to be a closely connected series of requirements for effective naval planning in the modern era. First, if plans are to be drawn up, and later carried through operationally, then one needs adequately trained staff officers both at the centre, acting as the chief planners, and others serving the commanding officers at the sharp end. That obviously implies schemes of staff education; but what it also entails, if staff are to talk to and understand staff, is a set of principles common to all and suitable as a basis for action. In short, one needs doctrine. But doctrine is not sufficient, either at the centre or the periphery; one also needs informed discussion. At the operational level it may well be necessary so officers understand fully what is expected of them, and can if needed point out potential difficulties. Much the same is necessary at the planning level; here we can refer again to what W. Graham Greene wrote in 1910: