Can state contracts with PSCs enhance a state's control of force? Optimists and pessimists come to different conclusions about this important question. Much of their disagreement, however, can be explained by the fact that they emphasize different dimensions of control and compare PSCs to different state forces. The institutional synthesis proposed in chapter two suggests that privatization's effects should vary, first and foremost, with the capacities of existing state forces. Furthermore, privatization is likely to have different effects on functional, political, and social control.

Particularly, strong (capable, coherent, legitimate) states have more capacity with which to direct and oversee contracts, but also a better force to begin with. In general, strong states should experience some loss in efficiency (dollar cost) or effectiveness (responsiveness) related to functional control when they outsource “sovereign services” already provided by public security organizations. They may also gain new capabilities (either services not provided by the military or more services than are available from the current structure) but these should cost more or be less responsive than military forces. Weak states do not have the same kinds of capacities to begin with and thus may achieve short-run functional gains from contracting with PSCs. If state institutions are corrupt or otherwise debilitated they may be so ineffective and/or illegitimate that private alternatives offer capabilities simply not available via the state. However, the poor capacity of weak states also makes their use of PSCs risky.