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  3. Mindreading and Social Cognition
  • Cited by 13
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
January 2022
Print publication year:
2022
Online ISBN:
9781108946766
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108946766
Subjects:
Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy of Mind and Language, Philosophy
Series:
Elements in Philosophy of Mind
Information

Book description

The cognitive ability to think about other people's psychological states is known as `mindreading'. This Element critiques assumptions that have been formative in shaping philosophical theories of mindreading: that mindreading is ubiquitous, underpinning the vast majority of our social interactions; and that its primary goal is to provide predictions and explanations of other people's behaviour. It begins with an overview of key positions and empirical literature in the debate. It then introduces and motivates the pluralist turn in this literature, which challenges the core assumptions of the traditional views. The second part of the Element uses case studies to further motivate the pluralist framework, and to advocate the pluralist approach as the best way to progress our understanding of social cognitive phenomena.

References

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