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  • Cited by 6
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    This chapter has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Singh, J. P. 2015. Diffusion of Power and Diplomacy: New Meanings, Problem Solving, and Deadlocks in Multilateral Negotiations. International Negotiation, Vol. 20, Issue. 1, p. 73.

    Tallberg, Jonas and McCall Smith, James 2014. Dispute settlement in world politics: States, supranational prosecutors, and compliance. European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 20, Issue. 1, p. 118.

    Agius, Maria F. 2012. Strategies and Success in Litigation and Negotiation in the WTO. International Negotiation, Vol. 17, Issue. 1, p. 139.

    Jackson, Sarita 2012. Small states and compliance bargaining in the WTO: an analysis of theAntigua–US Gambling Services Case. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 25, Issue. 3, p. 367.

    Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2011. Why Do Some Countries Get Better WTO Accession Terms Than Others?. International Organization, Vol. 65, Issue. 04, p. 639.

    Moon, Don 2010. The Changing Status of Developing Countries under the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Pacific Focus, Vol. 25, Issue. 1, p. 136.

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  • Print publication year: 2006
  • Online publication date: September 2009

8 - Compliance bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the bananas dispute

Summary

Introduction

Studies of bargaining in the international economy routinely focus on negotiations regarding the original terms of agreements ex ante rather than on discussions regarding compliance with those commitments ex post. A few scholars have called attention to this often neglected aspect of international negotiations: compliance bargaining. The dynamics of compliance bargaining have particular importance for developing countries, whose post-agreement negotiating power is arguably constrained in many settings. This chapter examines compliance bargaining in the World Trade Organization (WTO) through a case study of Ecuador's tactics in its challenge against the banana import regime of the European Union (EU).

After prevailing in its legal case against the EU banana scheme (as a co-complainant with others), Ecuador pursued an aggressive strategy to encourage compliance with the ruling. In the framework of Odell, Ecuador's stance in this high-profile dispute was a purely distributive strategy. In the universe of international economic negotiations, all compliance bargaining tilts toward the distributive end of the spectrum, as one party claims another has failed to deliver benefits that were previously promised. In the bananas dispute, Ecuador's negotiators creatively sought to maximize their leverage within the specific institutional framework of WTO rules. What is striking about this case is the extent to which those rules – some interpreted and applied for the first time – enabled Ecuador, in effect, to punch above its weight in the multilateral trade system.

As a test of developing country leverage in WTO compliance bargaining, the bananas dispute is a least likely case.

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Negotiating Trade
  • Online ISBN: 9780511491610
  • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491610
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